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Abstract
In this dissertation I use theory, empirics, and calibration with Vietnamese firm-level
data which I obtain from the Statistics General Office of Vietnam to examine the effects of
international trade and foreign direct investment on the hiring of informal employment.
In the first chapter, I study the effects of export opportunities on the share of
informal employment across firms in an environment in which tariffs through demand volume
and volatility can affect firms’ hiring decisions. I demonstrate that the heterogeneity in
productivity is a relevant factor in explaining changes in informality share. It is predicted
that access to international trade reduces the incidence of informality if the effects of raising
output on the demand for formal workers dominate the increased demand for informal
workers due to the greater volatility. Using tariff data on the United States-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement together with the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys, I find that greater
export opportunities are significantly related to reductions in relative demand for informal
employment, and focusing on cross section variation, more productive firms hire a lower
share of informal workers. Larger firms respond less to tariff liberalization, so my findings
suggest that access to international markets may be the most effective for smaller exporters
to reduce informal employment.
The second chapter provides firm-level evidence of the relationship between foreign
investment and informal employment. I examine the informality differentials between
FDI and domestic firms and the informality spillover effect of FDI in the Vietnamese
manufacturing sector. The results indicate that FDI firms not only create more jobs but
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also reduce informality by creating relatively more formal jobs. Foreign multinationals offer
higher wages than domestic firms even after controlling for differences in informality share.
The prevalence of foreign direct investment generates a negative spillover effect in terms of
informality share in domestic firms within an industry, but increases the informality level of
domestic firms within a province.
In the third chapter, I analyze the effects of trade liberalization and foreign direct
investment on labor informality in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that
escalating import competition increases the size of the informal sector, inducing a reallocation
of workers from the formal sector to informal firms. More specifically, the informal sector
grows by 1.5% in response to a 10% drop in import tariffs. Alternatively, export opportunities
diminish the level of informality, suggesting that a 10% drop in export tariffs reduces the
size of the informal sector by 0.1%. Comparative advantage in wages motivates agents to
reallocate labor between the two sectors. Moreover, the FDI analysis shows that a decline
in the size of the formal sector is associated with increases in foreign direct investment.
Quantitatively, a 10% increase in FDI reduces informal output and employment by 2%.
This is because foreign firms bring intense competition that drives out both formal and
informal domestic firms, creating a smaller informal labor market. The policy implication
is that export and FDI liberalization should be employed to improve labor conditions by
reducing the level of informality.
v
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Chapter 1
Exports and Informality: Firm-Level
Theory and Evidence
1.1 Introduction
In Vietnam, informal employment is a major component of the labor market. Informal
jobs are often associated with low job quality and bad working conditions. Countries
struggling with informal employment consider trade liberalization as a potential policy to
lift informal employees to formal employment and improve living standards.1 For trade
policy to deliver these benefits, firms must adjust their hiring decisions in response to trade
liberalization. This paper extends the existing theory to examine firms’ competing incentives
to hire workers informally and to predict the potential consequences of trade liberalization.
Firm-level data from Vietnam provide background information to support my modeling
strategy and provide empirical evidence for my theory’s predictions.
My data report the number of formal or informal workers employed by Vietnamese
firms and provides three informative facts. First, firms either employ formal workers only,
or they mix informal with formal workers. Rarely do firms work only with informal workers.
1Colombia and India have similarly high levels of informal employment as found by Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2003) for Columbia, by Nataraj (2011) for India, and by McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) for Vietnam.
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Therefore, industry-level informal employment is determined by an extensive margin, the
number of firms hiring informal workers, and an intensive margin, the number of informal
workers that firms hire relative to formal workers. The second fact shows that these extensive
and intensive margins vary widely to determine industries’ employment of informal workers.
Finally, the data provide evidence that firm heterogeneity is important to explain the share
of informal workers in total employment.
My theory reconciles these facts. Saint-Paul (1997) shows that, if demand is volatile,
then firms consider hiring informal workers because they are easier to fire in the case of bad
demand shocks. However, firms always hire formal workers because they are more efficient.
I extend this model to examine how firm heterogeneity in productivity affects firms’ trade-
off between hiring formal and informal workers. The theory shows that the effect of firm
productivity on the intensity of informal employment depends on the monitoring costs. If
monitoring costs increase in productivity, perhaps because firms get larger and employees
have more opportunity to shirk, then smaller firms self-select into hiring informal workers.
In that case, greater productivity predicts lower shares of informal employment. However,
if more productive firms are also better at monitoring workers, then the model predicts that
higher productivity is associated with greater shares of informal workers. Consequently,
the relationship between firm productivity and hiring of informal workers is an empirical
question.
The model also shows that export opportunities have an ambiguous effect on hiring
informal workers. Conditional on firm productivity, an increase in a firm’s labor force
associated with increased sales reduces firms’ incentive to hire informal workers. However, a
potential increase in total sales volatility due to unstable export markets leads firms to shift
to informal workers in order to minimize expected hiring and firing costs.
I use Vietnamese firm-level data to provide evidence that larger and more productive
firms are less likely to hire informal workers and that these firms hire a lower share of informal
workers. Based on my model, this is evidence that monitoring costs and productivity are
2
positively correlated. Next I provide evidence of how export opportunities affect firms’
hiring of informal versus formal workers. I exploit the effect of tariff changes with respect
to the U.S. market owing to the 2001 United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement
(BTA). I provide evidence that industries exposed to greater export opportunities reduce
their relative demand for informal workers. I also show that larger firms respond less to
the tariff reforms. This is consistent with the results that larger firms employ lower shares
of informal employment before the trade liberalization. Combined, the empirical evidence
shows that export liberalization leads smaller firms to move beyond hiring informal workers
as they increase their sales, despite the potentially negative effects due to increased volatility.
Identification requires a measure of informal employment, firm productivity, and export
opportunities. My data provide two measures of informal employment standard in the
literature. One measure reports the number of workers without a formal contract, whereas
in the other measure, informal workers are those to whom their employer does not contribute
to social security. I focus on the former for my main results and examine robustness with
respect to alternative definitions. I use firm size as a proxy for productivity. I employ two
measures of export opportunity: the firm’s export status and, following McCaig and Pavcnik
(2018), export liberalization with respect to the U.S. While export status is an extensive
measure, tariff liberalization provides an intensive measure, as I expect that industries with
greater tariff liberalization saw a greater increase in export opportunity. Firms may engage
in the informal labor market due to their location, industry, management, and ownership.
Variation across firms and time allows us to mitigate potential omitted variable bias by using
various sets of fixed effects. Finally, I examine the effect of clustering on standard errors for
my various hypothesis tests.
Identifying the impact of changes in international trade environment on the share
of informal employment is an on-going area of research. Empirical studies find industry-
level evidence that trade can affect the extent of informality in developing countries. Paz
(2014), who uses Brazilian data, finds that a decrease in import tariffs by Brazil’s trade
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partners reduces the share of informality in Brazil, but a reduction in the Brazilian import
tariffs increases the share of informal labor. McCaig and Pavcnik (2018), using Vietnam
household surveys, find evidence that export opportunities lead to a reallocation of workers
from household businesses to the formal enterprise sector. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003)
also use St. Paul’s dual labor market model to motivate an empirical study of the effect
of import tariffs on the share of informal employment in Brazil and Colombia. They find
a slight increase in the informality share in response to import tariff cuts in Colombia but
find no such effect in Brazil. Aleman-Castilla (2006) finds that increased access to the
U.S. market decreases the informal employment in the Mexican tradable sector, whereas a
reduction in Mexican import tariffs has no impact on the share of informal labor. Bosch
et al. (2012) find little effect of reductions in the degree of trade protection on the changes in
informality in Brazilian metropolitan labor markets. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011),
who use Brazilian data, find no evidence that changes in import tariffs affect the probability
that a worker will switch from a formal to informal job. Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014)
show that a decrease in import tariffs raises the industry-level share of informal employment
for Argentinean manufacturing sectors. Fugazza and Fiess (2010), using different data sets
and alternative definitions for informal labor, do not find any conclusive relationship between
trade liberalization and informality share.
My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I examine firm
heterogeneity. My informative facts suggest that firm heterogeneity is relevant to explain
the share of informal employment. This evidence complements the work of Paz (2014), who
employs a heterogeneous firm model, but does not reconcile the empirical fact that most
firms only use formal workers or mix formal with informal employees. Reconciling all three
facts allows us to examine an alternative channel for the existence of informality because
the Paz’s (2014) payroll tax compliance decisions channel is not significant in Vietnam.2
2My paper also complements the study by Ulyssea (2018), who explains the hiring of both formal and
informal workers within a formal firm in Brazil, but does not examine the effect of trade on informal
employment. In the theory, he supposes that firms face a “constant payroll tax on formal workers” and
“an increasing and convex expected cost to hire informal workers.” This structure guarantees that firms mix
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Second, I also examine sales volatility as a channel of informality. Sales volatility leads to
an increase in the relative demand for the informal employment of a firm. This evidence
extends the paper by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), who examine the relationship between
trade liberalization and firm-level share of informality through the revenues channel. Third,
the theoretical predictions and empirical results of the literature are mixed and far from
conclusive. I provide firm-level evidence that greater export opportunities for Vietnamese
firms decrease their relative informal employment. This evidence complements McCaig and
Pavcnik (2018), who use a different Vietnamese dataset and find that export liberalization
contributes to industry-level decreases in informality. Fourth, despite the prediction of
standard trade models like Melitz (2003) that there are heterogeneous responses of firms
to trade, little is known about how trade liberalization affects the hiring decisions on the
informal labor of small firms differently from that of large firms. My results show that larger
firms respond less to tariff liberalization, thus suggesting that smaller exporters benefit the
most.
My empirics contribute to the current research that examines the relationship between
volatility and trade at the micro level. For example, Čede et al. (2018) show that exporting
has a positive impact on firm-level sales volatility for Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. Vannoorenberghe (2012) and Nguyen and Schaur (2010), using French and
Danish data, find that higher export share is associated with higher sales volatility of the firm.
In contrast, Buch et al. (2009) show that larger export share is related to a lower volatility
of German firms. Kurz and Senses (2016), while examining the relationship between the
volatility of employment growth and trade, find that U.S. exporters are less volatile than
non-export firms. My paper focuses on the impact of exporting on the interquartile range of
total output produced by Vietnamese firms. I find that export firms are more volatile than
informal and formal workers and that larger firms hire a lower share of informal workers. However, I think
this channel is not suitable in the context of Vietnam due to different labor laws. In addition, the channel
does not provide a good mechanism through which trade affects the hiring of informal workers.
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non-exporters, raising firms’ demand for informal employment. However, this positive effect
is offset by the increase in size due to exporting.
My paper complements the empirical literature on the employment protection on
employment dynamics. In particular, many papers examine a firm’s motivation to hire
temporary workers who do not have employment protection. For example, Devicienti et al.
(2015), using Italian data, find firm-level evidence that unionization and demand volatility
have a positive effect on the share of temporary workers. Saha et al. (2013) examine the
impact of trade openness and worker bargaining power on the share of temporary workers
across Indian industries. Caggese and Cuñat (2008) show that financing constraints affect
firms’ hiring decisions regarding temporary employment in Italy. Bosch et al. (2012) suggest
that increased firing costs and unionization are associated with higher levels of informality
across Brazilian industries. My paper suggests that firm-level sales volatility affects the
hiring of informal workers (or temporary workers, depending on the context of the study).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and facts of
labor informality in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and its predictions.
In Section 4, I provide the empirical analysis of the relationship between export liberalization
and the informality share, main results, and several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Background on Informal Employment in Vietnam
My measure of informality reports the number of workers without formal employment
contracts at the firm level in Vietnam. This definition of informality focuses on job quality
and social protection across workers (Saavedra and Chong, 1999) and has been employed
in theory and empirical work emphasizing the effect of firms’ hiring decisions on informal
employment (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003).3 I observe data from a representative survey of
3The complementary definition focuses on household businesses or self employment (McCaig and Pavcnik,
2018; Perry et al., 2007).
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Food processing 1,647 0.40 0.58 0.02
Tobacco products 21 0.48 0.52 0.00
Textiles 423 0.53 0.41 0.06
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 655 0.59 0.36 0.05
Leather, leather products and footwear 283 0.47 0.48 0.05
Wood and products of wood and cork 590 0.41 0.56 0.02
Paper and paper products 425 0.51 0.45 0.04
Printing and publishing 313 0.61 0.37 0.02
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 11 0.73 0.18 0.09
Chemicals and chemical products 426 0.64 0.34 0.02
Rubber and plastics products 549 0.57 0.38 0.06
Other non-metallic mineral products 828 0.49 0.50 0.01
Basic metals 149 0.57 0.41 0.02
Fabricated metal products 722 0.53 0.43 0.04
Machinery and equipment 278 0.54 0.42 0.03
Office, accounting and computing machinery 7 0.43 0.57 0.00
Electrical machinery and apparatus 180 0.63 0.33 0.03
Radio, television and communication equipment 87 0.72 0.24 0.03
Medical, precision and optical instruments 45 0.82 0.18 0.00
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 173 0.49 0.48 0.03
Other transport equipment 254 0.53 0.45 0.02
Furniture manufacturing 530 0.47 0.48 0.04
Total 8,596 0.51 0.46 0.03
Notes: Formal firms are firms that use only formal workers. Mixed firms offer both formal and informal contracts. Informal
firms employ only informal jobs.
Vietnamese firms with more than 10 employees covering the period 2002-2005.4 Firms are
sorted into industries according to the Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC)
1993. For summary statistics on the number of firms and incidence of firm-level employment,
see Table 1.1. I focus on 127 distinct four-digit manufacturing industries. Data are collected
by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam with the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (VES).
A potential problem with all data reported on informal employment is that firms might
misreport the number of their employees with contracts or those are contributed to social
4The survey responses were collected annually from 2000 to 2013, but consistent data on exports and
measures of informal labor are only available from 2002-2005. In the empirical section, I will examine
robustness with respect to alternative measures.
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security. There are two reasons to believe this is not causing a systematic problem. First,
under the Law on Statistics, all firms are legally required to comply with the survey. Second,
firms have no reason to under report the number of temporary workers, because hiring
temporary workers is legal in Vietnam.
For comparison with the existing literature, I decompose the change in the total number
of employees without a formal labor contract from years 2002 to 2005 into within- and across-
industry variation (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2018; Paz, 2014). Let
Ejt be industry j’s total number of workers in year t and ijt be the share of informal workers in
total employment. Define Ej = 1/2(Ej2002 +Ej2005) and ij = 1/2(ij2002 + ij2005). The change





the first component measures within-industry variation and the second component measures
across-industry variation. I find that informal employment decreased over this time period
in Vietnam, and 88% of the decrease in informal employment is due to within-industry
adjustment of informal employment. This is consistent with the findings in Paz (2014) and
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), using different data sources and time periods. McCaig and
Pavcnik (2018), using different data for Vietnam and time periods, find that the variation
within and across industries is about equal, each accounting for about 50% percent.
With this industry variation in mind, I now develop three empirical facts that examine
firms’ role in determining informal employment.
Fact 1: Most firms use only formal employment contracts or mix formal with informal
employment contracts.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics across 2-digit industries for the year 2002.5
Columns (1)-(4) present the total number of firms, share of firms that only offer formal
contracts, share of firms with formal and informal positions, and share of firms with only
informal workers. The economy-wide share of firms that use informal labor is 49 percent, but
this figure varies across industries. Most of the remaining firms hire only formal employees.
5Patterns are similar in other years.
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This is consistent with Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), who show that firms may maintain
both types of employees to optimally respond to market volatility. This fact is inconsistent
with Paz (2014), whose theory provides intuition that firms sort exclusively into formal
and informal employment based on productivity. A possible reason is that my measure of
informal labor is different. According to Paz’s theory and data, firms that use informal
workers face the risk of getting caught and fined. In contrast, informal jobs are legal in
Vietnam, and only misuse results in a monetary penalty.6
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) focus on a representative firm model and do not model
a firm selection margin. Fact 1 suggests that the sorting mechanism is not quite as discrete
as suggested by Paz (2014), but implies that firms sort between using only formal workers
and mixing formal and informal workers. To examine this finding, let Lij be the number
of informal employees in industry j and Lj be the total number of workers. Let Nj be the
total number of firms and N ij be the number of firms that hire informal employees. Then,
the intensity of informal workers,
Lij
Lj
, decomposes into a measure of average use of informal





, and an extensive margin measure
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. Therefore, all variation across











to obtain an R-squared of 28 percent.7
Fact 2: Across industries, both intensive and extensive variation in informal employ-
ment explain variation in average informal employment intensity.
6I consulted the data provider, the 1994 labor law, and, the 2002 and 2006 amended labor codes. Firms
can legally have a no-contract employment relationship with a seasonal or short-term (1-3 months) worker.
Hence, informal jobs in this data set do not necessarily capture the firms’ compliance with labor laws
and involuntary informal labor. Weak law enforcement and workers’ lack of knowledge about their rights,
however, allow for the possibility that some informal jobs do not meet basic legal requirements. A legal
violation, for instance, occurs when the employer uses temporary/informal workers for long-term jobs.






, the residual variation explained by the second components is 13 percent. If I split
the difference, then the second component explains about 20 percent of the variation.
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If firm heterogeneity is important to explain the sorting of firms into using informal
labor, then I expect that firm heterogeneity is also important to explain the intensity of
informal labor used. To examine this, I first regress the firm-level shares of informal
employment on an industry fixed effect and then add a firm fixed effect. The R-squared
from these regressions are 0.07 and 0.38, suggesting that firm heterogeneity is important in
explaining variation in the intensity of informal employment.
Table 1.2 Informality Share and Firm Heterogeneity
(1) (2)
Observations 45258 45258
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.38
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes
Notes: The unit of observation in the pooled cross sectional data is firm. The dependent variable is the share of informal
workers which equals the number of informal workers/total number of employment within a firm. The within adjusted
R-squared in column 2 is estimated using the command ”areg” in Stata.
Fact 3: Firm heterogeneity is a relevant factor to predict heterogeneity in the intensity
of informal employment.
Existing theories don’t reconcile all of my facts. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) provide
intuition that firms may use both formal and informal workers, which is consistent with my
Fact 1. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) do not provide intuition for Facts 2 and 3, which suggest
a sorting of firms into varying intensities of informal employment. Paz (2014) provides
intuition for the sorting of firms, but it is not consistent with Fact 1 that shows that firms
may use both formal and informal workers. In the following section, I combine the models
of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Paz (2014) to reconcile my empirical facts and provide




1.3.1 Production and Costs
In each period, a firm with productivity ϕ hires lt units of labor to produce output qt
according to the production function lt =
qt
ϕ
. Following Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and
Saint-Paul (1997), firms choose to either hire workers with a formal employment contract lFt




t . For simplicity,
informal workers are as productive as formal workers.
Firms monitor informal workers to observe their effort perfectly. Therefore, to hire
an informal worker, the firm must pay the reservation wage wI = R. Because monitoring
informal workers is costly, in each period the firm also incurs the monitoring cost m(ϕ)
to observe an informal worker’s effort. I consider two cases, constant monitoring costs
and monitoring costs that are related to productivity, such that higher productivity is
related to lower monitoring costs, m′(ϕ) < 0. In the case of informal workers, Davis
and Harrigan (2011) show in theory that firms with better monitoring ability pay lower
wages. For notational ease, I treat the relationship of the monitoring cost with productivity








The firm offers efficiency wages for formal workers to prevent shirking and elicit effort.
Let δ be the discount rate, x the probability of catching a shirker, and, φt the probability of
firing a worker for reasons other than shirking, Saint-Paul (1997) shows that the efficiency
















the cost of formal workers totals








The cost function has a kink. In any period, the firm must decide how many formal workers
to employ, taking into account its stock of formal employees lFt−1. To increase in the pool
of formal employees, the firm incurs the marginal cost a + b. However, to reduce the pool
of formal employees, the marginal savings are only a. The intuition is straightforward. If
the firm fires people, then due to the uniform firing rule, the retained employees demand
a greater wage to perform. As a consequence, there is an adjustment cost. Firing people
increases the cost of each retained worker.
Following Saint-Paul (1997) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), I assume that wI +m >
a+ b. Therefore, while it is possible that formal employees receive higher wages, the cost of
hiring informal employees is greater due to monitoring costs.
1.3.2 Demand
The preferences of a representative consumer are given by a CES utility function with





Demand is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, θt. Qt and Pt are the CES quantity and price
aggregators that, in monopolistic competition, are determined endogenously. I focus on
partial equilibrium and take Rt = PtQt as given.
1.3.3 Firm’s Labor Demand
Combining demand with the production function and subtracting the cost of formal
and informal workers, the value of the firm equals










σ − alFt+1 (1.1)
− bmax(lFt+1, lFt )− (wI +m)lIt+1 + δEtV (lFt+1, αt+2)
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t+1. Based on this information and knowledge of the existing stock of formal
employees lFt , the firm determines the optimal number of formal and informal workers to
produce the optimal output to sell on the market.
In a static model, firms would exclusively hire formal workers because they are cheaper
and as productive as informal workers. In this dynamic version of the efficiency wage
model, firms take into account that hiring more formal workers affects future profits due
to expected firing costs
∂δEtV (lFt+1,αt+2)
∂lft+1
= δk(lFt ). Then, firms hire additional formal workers
if the marginal revenue from increasing the labor force is greater than the marginal costs,
including the expected marginal firing costs, and the marginal cost of hiring an informal
worker exceeds the marginal cost of hiring a formal worker. On the other hand, firms
hire additional informal workers if the demand shock is such that marginal revenues from
increasing the labor force are greater than the marginal cost of hiring an informal worker
and the marginal cost of hiring an informal worker is lower than the cost of hiring a formal
worker. I formally distinguish these cases with the first-order conditions of (1.1) with respect
to lIt+1 and l
F
t+1.

















σ > wI +m, (1.2)







σ < wI +m (1.3)
For a given choice of lFt+1, the firm increases its labor force with temporary workers if the
marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost. To determine the optimal choice of lFt+1 and if
the marginal cost of hiring temporary workers is lower, I require first-order conditions w.r.t.
lFt+1. I distinguish three cases.
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σ + δk(lFt+1) = a+ b (1.4)


























σ + δk(lFt+1) = a (1.5)
Case 3: Maintaining the formal labor pool lFt+1 = l
F
t :









σ + δk(lFt ) ≤ a+ b
⇒lFt+1 = lFt (1.6)
Combined, the first-order conditions determine the relevant case and optimal lIt+1, l
F
t+1
conditional on the demand shock αt+1 and stock of formal employees l
F
t at the beginning of
the period. With slight modifications for my setup, Saint-Paul (1997), Appendix Chapter 4,
shows that the solution exists. For a sufficiently high shock αt+1 > α, the firm hires l
F
t+1 = l̃









σ = wI +m. The upper bound for formal
labor, l̃, is determined implicitly by the relationship





























. Let sIt+1 be the share of informal workers a
firm hires in any given period. Then, based on the first-order conditions and the solution to
the optimization problem, I can show the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.1. (i) If ∂m
∂ϕ
= 0, then st+1
∂ϕ
= 0 (ii) If ∂m
∂ϕ
= −Θ < 0, then st+1
∂ϕ
> 0. (iii) If
∂m
∂ϕ
= Θ > 0, then st+1
∂ϕ
< 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
The first case shows that an increase in productivity does not affect the share of
informal labor if the relative cost of hiring informal and formal workers remains the same.
The reason for this is that an increase in total factor productivity does not affect relative
productivity. Therefore, as productivity increases, firm proportionately increases formal
and informal employment. This case is consistent with Paz (2014), according to which the
share of informal employment does not depend on firm productivity. The second case shows
that, if the cost of hiring informal employees decreases as productivity increases, then the
share of informal employees increases as a firm become more productive. In other words, if
firms that are more productive are also better at monitoring workers, then the increase in
total factor productivity is also associated with a decrease in the relative cost of informal
workers, and firms shift into informal employment. On the other hand, if firms that are
more productive incur greater monitoring costs, then more productive firms shift into formal
labor. A reason for this could be that monitoring costs increase as workers have to work
with newer technologies that require more supervision. An alternative explanation could be
that larger firms incur greater costs of acquiring information about informal personnel.8
Combined, proposition 1 suggests that the relationship between productivity and the
demand for informal employment is an empirical question. As standard trade models suggest
that mostly high productivity firms engage in export activity (Melitz, 2003), this relationship
is important in determining the effect of export opportunities on the demand for informal
relative to formal employment. However, given the heterogeneity in productivity, it is not
obvious which firms likely employ informal workers. I examine this with the following
proposition.
8Many studies focus on the assumption that larger employers have more difficulty monitoring workers to
explain the size-wage relationship (see Garen (1985), Barron et al. (1987), Brown and Medoff (1989), and
Ferrer and Lluis (2008)).
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Proposition 1.2. (i) If ∂m
∂ϕ
= 0, then the probability of hiring informal workers does not
depend on productivity. (ii) If ∂m
∂ϕ
< 0, then firms with greater productivity are more likely
to hire informal workers (iii) If ∂m
∂ϕ
> 0, then firms with greater productivity are less likely
to hire informal workers.
For proof, see A.1. Proposition 2 establishes which firms I expect to hire informal
workers. Again, this is an empirical question. Whether firms that are highly productive and
therefore likely engaged in export activity also are the firms that are likely to hire informal
workers depends on whether greater productivity is also associated with lower monitoring
costs.
1.3.4 Export Liberalization
How does trade liberalization affect firms according to my model? Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2003) assume that the representative firm is a price taker and that prices follow
a cumulative distribution function, say F (P ). They logically argue that import competition
reduces prices on the domestic market and therefore leads to a new distribution such that
F ∗(p) > F (p), and the expected price under liberalized trade is lower, EF ∗(p) < EF (p).
They prove that this change in distribution reduces l̃, the maximum number of formal
workers a firm would be willing to employ. Instead of considering price-reducing import
competition, I examine demand-increasing export opportunities. As such, I assume that
export liberalization leads to a new distribution of revenues shocks, G∗(α) < G(α), and
therefore increases the expected revenue shock EG∗(α) > EG(α). I obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.3. If trade liberalization increases revenue shocks such that G∗(α) < G(α),
then export liberalization will increase formal employment l̃
Proposition 3 is the reverse to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). As firms realize
export opportunities, increased revenues lead them to increase formal employment. On
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the other hand, two mechanisms may still increase informal employment relative to formal
employment. First, the new distribution realizations of the shock may be such that firms
hire even more informal workers.
Second, Saint-Paul (1997) shows that, if the new distribution is more volatile compared
to the distribution without export opportunities, then this may cause export activity to
increase the relative demand for informal employment. Existing results show that sales
volatility may indeed be associated with export activity (Vannoorenberghe, 2012; Giovanni
and Levchenko, 2009; Nguyen and Schaur, 2010).
My combined results show that the effect of productivity and export activity on the
relative demand for informal workers is an empirical question. In the next section, I deliver
an identification strategy to inform my and other existing theories on the direction and
magnitudes of these relationships.
1.4 Empirics
1.4.1 Additional Data
Trade Policy and Export Status
To estimate the relationship between trade and informal employment, I merge my data
on informal employment from the background section with export activity and trade policy.
Following McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) I construct industry-level trade policy measures based
on the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement which was implemented in December of 2001.
The trade policy agreement immediately reduced the U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports from
Column 2 to most-favored nation status. In my analysis, I follow McCaig (2011) to calculate
the U.S. industry-level tariffs on Vietnam exports pre- and post-BTA. I use the 2001 U.S.
tariffs downloaded from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s online Tariff Information
Center. I then compute the ad valorem rate of any tariff lines by converting specific rates
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to ad valorem equivalent rates. Next, I match these tariff lines to industries in order to
construct industry-level tariffs according to 4-digit ISIC nomenclature.9
My identification strategy relies on 6 features of the U.S tariff reductions discussed
in McCaig and Pavcnik (2018): (1) The magnitude of tariff cuts is large. (2) The tariff
cuts varied across manufacturing industries. (3) The tariff declines significantly increased
the volume as well as the share of Vietnamese exports to the U.S. (4) The BTA tariff
reductions are not correlated with global demand shocks for Vietnamese exports. (5) The
tariff declines are not correlated with pre-existing industry trends and levels. (6) The tariff
cuts are exogenous. Table 6 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for manufacturing
firms in the pre-BTA, post-BTA, and 2010-2013 periods.
Firms at the beginning of the year 2002 are assigned with the pre-BTA tariffs. The
BTA was implemented in December 2001. Due to the lack of data availability on informal
labor in 2000 and 2001, I use the calculated share of informal workers at the beginning of
the year for four years: 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Firms at the beginning of the year 2003,
2004, and 2005 are assigned with the post-BTA tariffs. Thus, my results may underestimate
the impact of the BTA on firms’ share of informal labor.
In addition to exploiting policy changes at the industry level, I also examine the
relationship between firms’ export status and informal employment. I obtain the firms’
export status from the Enterprise Surveys. Unfortunately, I do not observe product or
destination-level export transaction. However, the theory predicts that the levels and
volatility of sales due to export activity may affect the demand for informal workers. To
examine if these channels explain my results, I collect data on the total production for a
subset of manufacturing firms covered by the enterprise survey. I match the product data
with the firm-level data. This allows us to examine if export activity in Vietnam is associated
with mean shifts and changes in the volatility of production.
9I use the package named ’H2 to ISIC Rev 3’, which is available via the World Integrated Trade Solution
database. http://wits.worldbank.org/product-concordance.html
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1.4.2 Empirical Models and Identification
I start by exploiting large heterogeneous tariff cuts by the trade agreement to investigate
the relationship between trade policy and the demand for informal workers in the enterprise
sector in Vietnam. I relate both the share of informal workers and an indicator for whether
the firm employs any informal workers to BTA tariff across manufacturing industries:
Yjspt = β0 + β1τst + β2laborjspt + γp + λs + θt + εjspt, (1.8)
The dependent variable Yjspt stands for the share of informal employment computed as
the number of temporary workers divided by the total work force in firm j in industry
s of province p in year t. In an alternative specification, I let Yjspt be an indicator that
equals one if the firm hires informal workers. τst is the U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports
across industries and time. I proxy productivity with firm size, computed as log of total
employment, laborjspt. I also examine robustness with respect to an alternative measure of
productivity. To account for unobserved variables, I include province, industry, and year
fixed effect, γp, λs, and θt, respectively. To account for firm-level unobservables, I also
experiment with firm-level fixed effects to account for productivity differences.
The main parameter of interest is the coefficient on tariffs. A positive coefficient (β1 >
0) suggests that tariff reductions are associated with a decline in the share of informal workers
in a firm and a decrease in the probability of using informal workers. The coefficient on firm
size captures the impact of firm heterogeneity and examines the mechanisms explained in
Proposition 1.
Identification requires that changes in tariff are independent of firms’ demand for
informal employment. I follow the literature and take the tariff measure as exogenous.
Industry and province fixed effects account for institutional differences that may be correlated
with the local labor market and export activity. Sector fixed effects account for varying
production technologies that may favor temporary versus permanent work. For example, if
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jobs require intensive training, then this would lead firms to prefer permanent employees. If
these industries also benefit the most from trade liberalization, then omitting this information
might bias my estimates.
A potential threat to identification is the spurious correlation between my dependent
variable, the share of informal workers, and the contemporaneous total workforce. This is
less of a problem in the probability specifications, but is a concern when I examine the effect
of trade policy on the share of informal workers. I address the spurious correlation issue by
replacing the contemporaneous labor with either the lag of employment or labor in the year
2001. I also use lag of labor or employment in 2001 to instrument for the contemporaneous
labor variable.
My theory predicts heterogeneity across firms. Highly productive firms may rely more
or less on informal workers depending on their compensation. Therefore, effects of trade
liberalization may vary across firms. I do not observe firm-level exports, but interacting
tariff changes with my proxy for productivity allows for heterogeneous trade effects across the
productivity distribution consistent with standard trade models. To examine this prediction,
I add an interaction term between labor and tariffs to obtain:
Yjspt = β0 + β1τst + β2laborjspt + β3τst ∗ laborjspt + γp + λs + θt + εjspt (1.9)
The addition of the interaction term implies that the partial effect of tariffs on the share of
informal workers for an average firm is equal to β1 + β3 ∗ ¯labor, where ¯labor is the average
employment of the sample.
While I do not observe firm-level trade flows, I do observe an export status indicator.
I exploit this information and repeat my empirical models, including the export status
indicator instead of the industry-level tariff changes. The advantage of this indicator is
that it introduces firm-level variation. The disadvantage is that, for exporting firms that
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Table 1.3 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Informal Employment Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (τ) 0.041** 0.17*** 0.035* 0.043** 0.122***
(0.017) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036)
Labort -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Interaction -0.029*** -0.017***
(0.006) (0.006)
Industry FE Yes Yes No No No
Province FE Yes Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes Yes
N 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
just export volumes due to trade liberalization, this indicator does not capture that variation.
The above specifications using tariff changes are better suited for that type of adjustment.
Lastly, an additional concern may arise beyond my definition of informality. In addition
to my main definition of informality, the data also report employees without social security in
2010-2013. Thus, to be sure that my findings are robust to different informality definitions,
I repeat my previous analysis for the latter period.
1.4.3 Main Results
Table 1.3 reports the results from my regression of the share of informal workers on U.S.
import tariffs and firm size. Column (1) reports the baseline specification. The coefficient
on tariffs is positive and significant. Firms in industries that experienced greater export
opportunities due to U.S. tariff liberalizations reduced their relative demand for informal
workers. A 1 percentage point reduction in tariffs in a given industry reduces the share of
informal workers by about 0.04 percentage points.
Columns (2) augments the baseline specification with the interaction of total employ-
ment and tariffs to examine heterogeneity in the tariff effect. Larger firms respond less to
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tariff liberalization. This seems counterintuitive, as I would expect from standard trade
theory that especially large firms benefit from more access to international markets. On the
other hand, the baseline specification shows that larger firms already employ lower shares
of informal workers. Therefore, access to international markets may be most effective for
smaller exporters to reduce informal employment.
Column (3) reports results when I control for productivity differences with a firm fixed
effects instead of firm size. The coefficient on tariff liberalization is similar to the baseline
specification. Column (4) augments this specification with total firm size. Note that, in this
specification, the effect of firms size switches to a positive effect. Remember that, with firm
fixed effects, this coefficient is identified from within variation. While column (1) shows that
with cross section variation, larger firms hire a lower share of informal workers, focusing on
within-variation firms that increase size over the sample period shift into informal workers.
A plausible explanation is that firm fixed effects focus identification of short-term variation.
In the short term, firms that expand do so by increasing the share of temporary workers.
In column (5) I again examine heterogeneity in the effect of tariff liberalization. Firm fixed
effects do not change the conclusion. Larger firms adjust informal employment shares by
less in response to tariff liberalizations.
Table 1.4 reports the results from my probability model. Coefficient signs are similar as
when I focus on the share of informal employment, but I lose significance. Nevertheless, when
I account for heterogeneity in the effect of tariff liberalization on the probability of hiring
informal workers, the results corroborate the conclusions from the estimates on employment
composition. In particular, tariff liberalization reduces the probability of hiring informal
workers. Focusing on cross-section variation, larger firms are less likely to hire informal
workers. Conditioning on firm fixed effects shows that increases in the work force are
positively associated with the probability of hiring informal workers, similar to the share
regressions.
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Table 1.4 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Probability of Informal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (τ) 0.001 0.114* 0.007 0.02 0.307***
(0.032) (0.058) (0.034) (0.034) (0.066)
Labort -0.21 -0.018*** 0.064*** 0.071***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Interaction -0.025** -0.063***
(0.011) (0.012)
Industry FE Yes Yes No No No
Province FE Yes Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes Yes
N 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
I draw several conclusions. The results show that firm heterogeneity is important to
understand the effect of trade liberalization on informal employment. I reject the base case of
proposition 1 that relative costs of hiring informal workers are constant across firms. Cross-
section variation traces differences in firm size due to variation in productivity. Estimates
based on this source of variation therefore examine the relationship between exporting, firm
size, and the workforce composition most closely related to my theory.
My results allow us to draw several conclusions with respect to my theory. According to
propositions 1 and 2, firm heterogeneity is related to the informal employment composition
if relative costs of informal to formal workers vary systematically with firm size. My results
are consistent with the intuition that large firms have greater relative costs of hiring informal
workers than small firms. As a consequence, because large firms hire a lower share of informal
workers, they also respond less in terms of employment composition to changes in export
opportunities.
The results also show that the benefits of export opportunities to reduce informal
employment dominate the informality-increasing channel due to the greater uncertainty
based on volatile export markets. This could be the case for two reasons. First, exporting
raises the level of production, and this channel dominates the increase in volatility. Second,
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Table 1.5 Export Status, Total Output and Volatility
OLS Interquartile (0.05-0.95 quantiles)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export 1.126*** 0.171*** 0.913*** 0.651***
(0.05) (0.054) (0.104) (0.116 )
Labor 0.588*** 0.144***
(0.019) (0.03)
Observations 57262 52636 57262 52636
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. I use data on export
status when it is available in 2000-2005 period except the year 2001. The drop in observations is due to missing labor variable.
In columns (3) and (4), the standard errors are bootstrapped. All regressions include 2-digit industry and year fixed effects.
the U.S. is a relatively stable export market and actually lowers firms’ total sales volatility.
To examine this, I estimate the effect of exporting on the mean of log-total-output produced
and the 5th-95th interquartile range. Table 1.5 reports the results. Exporting firms produce
more output, but also experience a greater spread around the median. When I do not control
for firm size in columns (1) and (3), this could be due to the heterogeneity in productivity
or heterogeneity in sales shocks. In columns (2) and (4), I control for firm size to better
isolate the effect of exporting on volatility due to demand variation. Based on my theory, I
conclude that the effects of raising output on the demand for formal workers dominate the
increased demand for informal workers due to the greater volatility.
A natural follow up empirical question is whether sales volatility affects firms’ hiring
of informal employment. I follow Nguyen and Schaur (2010) to construct a measure of sales
volatility based on total sales of a firm. Following Kurz and Senses (2016) for the measure
of intensity, I calculate the informal employment intensity as average informal workers as a
fraction of average total workers over the years. I then regress the informal labor intensity
on sales volatility and industry fixed effects. The assessment for proposition 3 is displayed
in Table 1.6. Firms that experience larger sales volatility increase their hiring of informal
workers. This result is consistent with my prediction.
To examine the effects of export status further, in Table 1.7 I report the effects of export
status and firm size on the share and probability of hiring informal workers. Without firm
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Table 1.6 Effect of Sale Volatility on Informal Employment Intensity
Share of Informal Workers Indicator of Informal Workers
2002-2005 2006-2013 2002-2005 2006-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales volatilty 0.021* 0.098*** 0.044** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 4561 4963 4561 4963
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column (2) uses an alternative measure
of informal employment because the data report number of workers who do not receive social security from their employer
during the period 2006-2013.
Table 1.7 Export Status and Informal Employment
Share of Informal Workers Indicator of Informal Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export status -0.013*** -0.005 -0.036*** -0.014
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Labort -0.008*** 0.043*** -0.02*** 0.079***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Province FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
N 30527 30527 30527 30527
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
fixed effects, the results are consistent with the industry-level tariff reductions. Exporting
reduces the probability and share of informal workers. When including firm fixed effects,
the results on export status are insignificant. This suggests that it is not the export
extensive margin that drives changes in the share and probability of hiring informal workers.
Consequently, the significant effects of tariff changes on informal employment with firm fixed
effects are likely due to increases in the intensive margin. Two caveats apply. First, I do not
observe the extensive margin at the destination level, and I can therefore not examine it.
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Table 1.8 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Informal Employment Share, Using Lagged
Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff(τ) 0.016 0.167*** 0.016 0.181*** 0.039* 0.139*** 0.036* 0.143***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.038) (0.02) (0.038) (0.02) (0.04)
Labort -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.017*** -0.013***





Interaction -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.02***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Instrument
variable
No No Labort−1 Labort−1∗τ ,
Labort−1
No No Labor2001 Labor2001∗τ ,
Labor2001
N 31067 31067 31067 31067 19340 19340 19340 19340
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All columns
include year, province, and industry fixed effects.
Second, limited reporting of export status reduces the sample compared to my estimation
sample with industry-level tariff reductions.
1.4.4 Robustness Checks
I undertake several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the results to the
replacement of contemporaneous labor variable with lags of employment, an alternative
measure of productivity, the inclusion of small firms (firms that have fewer than 10 workers),
a different definition of informality, and more aggregated cluster-robustness. I conduct a
robustness exercise in which I re-estimate the coefficients in Table 1.3 columns (1) and
(2) using lagged employment and initial employment in 2001. I also use lagged labor and
employment level in 2001 to instrument for the contemporaneous employment. The estimates
are reported in Table 1.8, and these results are statistically significant and similar to those
in Table 1.3 for U.S. import tariffs when I account for heterogeneity in the effect of tariff
liberalization on the share of informal employment.
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Table 1.9 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Informal Employment Share, Using an Alternative
Measure of Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff(τ) 0.040** 0.071*** 0.035* 0.052**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
TFP -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Interaction -0.027*** -0.014
(0.010) (0.011)
Industry FE Yes Yes No No
Province FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
N 36580 36580 36580 36580
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In the second robustness check, I adopt an alternative measure of productivity which is
TFP.10 The results are shown in Table 1.9. The tariff estimated coefficients are statistically
significant in all specifications.
Small firms are less likely to export and more likely to hire informal workers. The
exclusion of firms with fewer than 10 workers may bias the results. Therefore, my third
robustness exercise adopts the full sample which includes all registered firms. The estimates
are displayed in Table 1.10, and these results are consistent with those in Table 1.3
In the next robustness check, I re-estimate specifications in Table 1.7 using the 2010-
2013 sample, which considers an alternative definition of informality, in which informal
workers are individuals who do not have social security. The results are displayed in Table
1.11. The estimated coefficient for export status is negative and statistically significant at
the 1% level in all columns, which provides a strong robustness check to the result in Table
1.7.
Because the choice of using cluster-robustness in panel data usually affects standard
errors and the significance of the estimated coefficients, I cluster SEs in the specifications from
10TFP is measured following Olley and Pakes’s (1996) method.
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Table 1.10 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Informal Employment Share, Including All Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff 0.039** 0.093*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.082***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.031)
Labor -0.015*** -0.014*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Interaction -0.013*** -0.006
(0.005) (0.006)
Industry FE Yes Yes No No No
Province FE Yes Yes No No No
Year FE yes yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes Yes
N 56630 56630 56630 56630 56630
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 1.3 at industry and industry-year levels. The results are presented in Table 1.12. As I
expect, cluster-robustness by industry and two-way cluster-robustness by industry and year
increase SEs and turn the tariff coefficient to insignificance in some specifications. However,
I can see in columns (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7) that the estimated coefficient for tariff is still
statistically significant.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the relationship between trade policy and informal
employment theoretically and empirically. My theoretical model shows two opposite channels
through which trade affects firms’ hiring of informal workers. First, conditional on firm
productivity, an increase in a firm’s labor force associated with increased export volume
reduces the firm’s incentive to hire informal workers. Second, a potential increase in total
sales volatility due to unstable markets causes firms to shift to informal workers in order to
minimize their expected hiring and firing costs. I also examine the relationship between firm
productivity and the hiring of informal workers, which turns out to be an empirical question.
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Table 1.11 Export Status and Informal Employment 2010-2013, Using an Alternative
Definition of Informality
Share of Informal Workers Indicator of Informal Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export status -0.122*** -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Labort -0.082*** 0.089*** -0.029*** 0.115***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Province FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
N 93849 93849 93849 93849
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
I assess my theories on the direction and magnitudes of these relationships using data
from Vietnam Enterprise Surveys. I find that firms reduced their relative demand of informal
workers in the industries with larger tariff cuts and that larger firms respond less to export
liberalization. This finding and the predictions in my theories point to the conclusion that the
U.S. tariff liberalization led to the dominance of effects of raising output on the demand for
formal workers over the increased demand for informal workers due to the greater volatility.
For my probability model, since some estimates are not statistically significant at the 10%
level, they provide mild support to my previous conclusion. Another important finding is
that increased intensive margins of exports are likely to be associated with reductions in
probability and the share of informal workers. For the effect of productivity on informality,
I find that larger firms hire a lower share of informal workers, whereas focusing on within-
variation firms that expand do so by increasing the relative demand for informal workers.
It is safe to say that access to international markets may be the most effective for
smaller exporters to reduce informal employment in developing countries, according to the
share of informal workers employed by a firm. Given the promising result for firms in
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Table 1.12 Effect of U.S. Tariffs on Informal Employment Share, with Cluster Robust at
Industry-year Level
Cluster-robust by industry Two-way cluster-robust by industry and year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Tariff(τ) 0.041 0.17*** 0.035 0.043** 0.122*** 0.041** 0.17*** 0.035 0.043 0.122
(0.029) (0.042) (0.023) (0.021) (0.035) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.061)
Labort -0.009*** -0.006** 0.034*** 0.036*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.034** 0.036**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction -0.029*** -0.017** -0.029*** -0.017
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Industry FE Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
Province FE Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
N 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655 43655
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Vietnam, studying the impacts of trade reforms on informality in other developing countries
remains an important topic for future research.
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Chapter 2
FDI and Informality: Evidence from
Vietnam
2.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that multinationals are larger, more productive, and pay
higher wages than domestic firms.1 This argument has been used to justify promotion
policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in many developing countries. However,
while foreign multinationals may contribute to increased employment and the development
of human capital in the host country, little is known about the interaction between foreign
ownership and informality. In these developing countries, a substantial share of employment
is in the informal sector, in which workers experience worse working conditions and fewer
benefits. Thus, attracting FDI can potentially be considered to be policy importance if
increased FDI boosts economic growth by drawing labor demand from the informal sector.
1Foreign firms pay higher wages than domestic firms because they are inherently larger, more productive,
and higher capital-intensive than local firms. Chen et al. (2011) argue that there are several alternative
reasons that may not be observable in data. First, foreigners may have to pay higher wages than domestic
firms to attract best employees. Second, foreign firms may offer higher salaries in order to lower “labor
turnover and thus minimize the leakage” of their technological advantages. Third, workers prefer domestic
to foreign firms because they may experience greater pressure and higher labor demand uncertainty in FDI
firms than in domestic firms.
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In this paper, I identify the direct and indirect effects of FDI on informal worker
allocation across firms using a Vietnamese firm-level data set, from which I construct a
measure of informality that reports the number of workers without social security or worker
benefits at the firm-level.2 This paper addresses the following questions: (1) Do FDI firms
demand a lower share of informal employment? (2) Does the presence of FDI create spillover
effects? There are multiple channels that result in a lower demand of informal workers. First,
foreign firms may use a different technology that requires a higher share of formal workers.3
Second, due to the possession of enhanced technology, know-how, and managerial practices,
such firms try to reduce worker turnover and thus minimize technology leakage by replacing
temporary jobs with formal positions that afford higher job satisfaction. Third, foreign
investors may face greater training and monitoring costs on informal workers, because they
are not accustomed to working with them. Fourth, foreign owned firms are less volatile
in production and thus minimize labor costs by hiring more formal workers.4 In contrast,
foreigners hire relatively more informal workers if, instead of being less volatile, foreign firms’
sales are more volatile.
An additional question is how the prevalence of FDI affects labor informality in the
host country. Current theories present ambiguous predictions on the effects of FDI on the
local economy. The two proposed channels are technology externalities and competition
effects. For example, technology externalities (or agglomeration effects) diffused from foreign
investment may improve the productivity of domestic firms through channels such as labor
pooling, imitation, and backward and forward linkages. The competition effect of FDI is
ambiguous. Hence, the spillover effect of foreign participation on the demand for informal
workers is clearly an empirical question.
2The definition focuses on job quality and social protection across workers.
3Empirical studies document overwhelming evidence of a positive relationship between the prevalence of
FDI and productivity across industries and firms (Javorcik, 2004; Matthias Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Lu
et al., 2017).
4Cao (2018) provides evidence of relationship between the volatility of firms’ sales and the demand of
informal workers.
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My analysis, based on firm-level data from Vietnam Enterprise Surveys, covers the
period from 2010-2013, showing that foreign firms hire a lower share of informal workers
than domestic firms, even after including firm characteristics such as total factor productivity,
export status, size, and economic zone indicator. The analysis of spillover effects suggests
that foreign participation has a significant spillover effect on the level of informal employment
in domestic firms. On the one hand, I find that an increase in FDI intensity in the same
industry lowers the demand for informal labor in domestic firms in that industry. On the
other hand, the results regarding within-province spillovers indicate that an increase in the
presence of FDI in the same province raises the share of informal employment in domestic
firms in that province. Collectively, these findings suggest that the estimated spillover effects
are the net effect of two opposite forces proposed in the literature, namely the technology
spillovers and the competition channels.
One of the contributions of the paper is that it provides an analysis of the effect of
foreign direct investment on the demand of informal employment in the host country. To
my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the effect of FDI on the relative demand for
informal workers at the firm level.5 Academic research on FDI and informality is lackluster
owing to the lack of available data that can provide information on firms’ characteristics
and their informal employment. In many countries, the fact that it is illegal for firms to
use informal workers prevents researchers from collecting reliable firm-level data on informal
employment. The Vietnamese data presents the advantage of providing detailed information
on the number of informal workers hired by a firm, because informal jobs are legal there.
My paper is also related to the literature that emphasizes the implications for employ-
ment. Waldkirch et al. (2009), using Mexican data, find that FDI has a significantly positive
effect on manufacturing employment. Karlsson et al. (2009), using Chinese manufacturing
firm-level data, find that foreign firms demonstrate high growth in employment. Bandick and
5The only exception is the study by Dougherty and Escobar (2013) on Mexico, which finds that increases
in stock of FDI are associated with lower share of informal employment, but the lack of data has limited
this work to informal employment at the industry level, thereby completely ignoring firm characteristics that
could impact firms’ hiring decisions on informal employment.
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Gorg (2010) find positive effects that FDI has on employment growth only if the acquisition
is vertical in Sweden. Jude and Silaghi (2016) provide evidence of FDI leading to negative
short-run effect on employment in Central and Eastern Europe ; however, the long-run effect
is positive. My paper complements this literature to the extent that FDI contributes to the
creation of new formal jobs and the destruction of informal jobs.
My work contributes to the literature that investigates the foreign wage premium
(Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004b; Sjöholm and Lipsey, 2006; Almeida, 2007; Girma and Gorg,
2007; Huttunen, 2007; Matthias Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Martins, 2011; Heyman et al.,
2011; Chen et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015; Peluffo, 2015). Controlling for the differences
in the share of informal workers, I find evidence of the foreign wage premium which is
consistent with previous studies. Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature that
examines the determinants of informality. For example, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003)
investigate the response of informal employment to trade liberalization in Colombia and
Brazil. Ulyssea (2018), who uses Brazilian data, shows a negative relationship between firm
size and productivity and the hiring of informal workers. My analysis shows that ownership,
export, size, and productivity are key determinants of the hiring of informal workers.
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background to FDI inflows
and informal employment in Vietnam. Next, I describes the data, the estimation strategy,
and the results. Robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Background of FDI and Informality Employment
in Vietnam
Before 1986, Vietnam was a closed economy, and there was zero foreign direct
investment in the country. However, FDI flows and stock have drastically increased since
Vietnam initiated the Doi Moi policy in the late 1980s that intended to facilitate the
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. The 1987 Law on Foreign
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Investment encouraged FDI in Vietnam and brought a wave of foreign-investment enterprises
from 1990 to 2016 (Figure 2.1). The sharp increase in FDI between 2006 and 2008 was due to
Vietnam’s 2007 accession to WTO.6 Most FDI inflows into Vietnam consisted of “greenfield”
investment, while only a small portion was the result of the expansion of existing projects.
With that said, many foreign investors chose Vietnam in which to open new plants, which
were expected to contribute to human capital development and the provision of enhanced
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Figure 2.1 Foreign direct investment, 1990-2016 (USD billion). Source: World Bank
Foreign ownership include those enterprises with 100% foreign capital or those are
joint venture between domestic and foreign firms. Nevertheless, FDI firms obey the same
labor law with domestic firms. In opposite to other developing countries, hiring informal
employment is lawful in Vietnam. The definition of informality ranges from workers without
contract to those without social security contributed by firms. In 2010, while roughly 27%
6This can provide a valid identification strategy to study the effect of FDI on outcomes in Vietnam.
However, I think it does not fit the structure of this paper because a large portion of the FDI increase flowed
into the service sector.
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of the labor force did not receive social security from all firms , that number is only 10%
among FDI firms. Moreover, one would expect differences among industries and regions due
to the spillover effects of FDI.
The spillover effects of FDI on informality share in domestic firms are ambiguous
because the competition channels and technology externalities are more likely to move in
opposite directions. The former channels refer to the competition between foreign-owned
firms and local firms in both product and labor markets. One possible channel is that
competition in the labor market may increase the demand for formal workers and drive
up wages for formal workers, leading to the reallocation of formal workers toward foreign
firms, and thus forcing local firms to increase the use of informal workers. This results in a
negative wage spillover effect of FDI in domestically-owned firms.7 This effect seems to be
substantial when considering regional spillovers of FDI in local firms. Second, competition
in product markets may impact domestic firms’ hiring decisions. In particular, intense
competition from foreign multinationals may draw demand from local firms, which results
in a fall in productivity owing to the diminishing scale economies.8 Domestic firms become
less productive, thereby hiring more informal workers.9 However, the effect of competition
in product markets may not be significant, because Vietnam is a small market, and Vietnam
has been used as an export platform for multinationals.
Technology externalities refer to a technology spillover to domestic firms through
several channels. Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that domestic technological progress
can occur via imitation of foreign multinational’s knowledge. In addition, they argue that
domestic firms may get access to foreign multinationals’ firm-specific knowledge through
7There is massive empirical evidence to support the existence of the wage spillovers. Aitken et al. (1996)
find wage spillovers in the United States. Bedi and Cielik (2002), using Polish data, identify evidence of wage
spillover effects. Driffield and Girma (2003) find positive wage spillovers among regions. Lipsey and Sjöholm
(2004a), using Indonesian manufacturing data, find positive spillover effects on wages in locally-owned plants.
In the case of China, Chen et al. (2011) find a significant negative spillover in wage level.
8Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that foreign firms producing for the domestic market can gain market
share from local firms, causing them to lose productivity. Lu et al. (2017), using Chinese firm-level data,
identify a negative spillover effect of FDI on domestic firms’ productivity.
9Cao (2018) finds that more productive firms use a lower share of informal workers.
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the recruitment of workers previously employed by foreign firms. Finally, technology
spillovers are likely to take place through the relationship between domestic suppliers of
intermediate goods and their foreign partners (backward linkage) or purchase of intermediate
inputs produced by multinationals (forward linkage). Javorcik (2004) finds evidence of
spillovers from FDI occurring through backward linkages. These technology spillovers may
improve the efficiency of domestic firms and lower the share of informal employment in
those domestic firms. Given the opposite spillover effects from competition channels and
technology externalities, the net informality spillover effect of FDI in Vietnamese domestic
firms is an empirical question. If the competition effects dominate the technology spillovers,
we will find that the presence of FDI increases the share of informal employment. On the
other hand, if the technology externalities offset the competition effects, FDI intensity is
negatively correlated with informality share.
2.3 Data
The data used in this study are from the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (VESs),
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam for the 2010-2013 period.10 These
surveys cover all of the registered enterprises with total employees over 30 and a random
sample of firms with less than 30 workers. Firms are sorted into industries according to the
Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) 2007. This paper focuses on 141 distinct
four-digit manufacturing industries. The sectoral distribution of firms and the foreign equity
share at the two-digit industry level in 2010 of the sample is presented in Table 2.1.
The data contain information on foreign ownership, sales, employment, total wages
and compensation, export status, and location. FDI firms are defined as enterprises with
100% foreign capital or joint venture between domestic and foreign firms. Average wages are
calculated by dividing total wages and compensation by the total employment. I estimate
10The survey responses were collected annually from 2000 to 2013, but consistent data on exports and
measures of informal labor are only available from 2010-2013.
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Table 2.1 Distribution of FDI Firms and Foreign Equity Share by Two-digit Industry in 2010
Domestic
firms
FDI firms All firms (2)/(3) Foreign eq-
uity share
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food processing & manufacturing 4,506 319 4,825 0.066 0.294
Beverage manufacturing 1,585 38 1,623 0.023 0.310
Tobaco products 22 4 26 0.154 0.124
Textiles 1,549 278 1,827 0.152 0.551
Wearing apparel, dressing & dyeing of fur 3,162 594 3,756 0.158 0.505
Leather, leather products & footwear 820 223 1,043 0.214 0.791
Wood & products of wood & cork 3,317 105 3,422 0.031 0.150
Paper & paper products 1,515 121 1,636 0.074 0.290
Printing & publishing 3,002 64 3,066 0.021 0.097
Coke, refined petroleum products 57 4 61 0.066 0.032
Chemicals & chemical products 1,350 283 1,633 0.173 0.484
Medical & pharmaceutical products 247 35 282 0.124 0.173
Rubber and plastics products 2,319 457 2,776 0.165 0.424
Other non-metallic mineral products 2,897 138 3,035 0.045 0.227
Basic metals 741 74 815 0.091 0.240
Fabricated metal products 5,873 540 6,413 0.084 0.369
Electronic & telecommunications equipment 340 209 549 0.381 0.927
Electric equipment & machinery 645 187 832 0.225 0.572
Special purpose equipment 819 101 920 0.110 0.474
Transport equipment 178 137 315 0.435 0.617
Other transport equipment 501 130 631 0.206 0.655
Furniture manufacturing 2,401 240 2,641 0.091 0.458
Other manufacturing 773 248 1,021 0.243 0.818
Maintenance & installation of machinery 657 21 678 0.031 0.019
Notes: Output-weighted average of foreign equity share across all firm in each two-digit industry.
firm productivity measured by TFP using the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).
Firm size is measured by log of total revenue. Export status indicates whether the firm is
exporting in the contemporary year. Lastly, the economic zone indicator equals 1 if the firm
is located in an economic zone and 0 otherwise. In panel A of Table 2.2, I compare firm
variables across domestic and FDI firms. In an unreported analysis (available upon request),
I find significant mean differences across domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms.
The data also report the number of workers to whom their employers do not contribute
social security. I divide that number by the total number of workers to obtain the share of
informal workers. One concern is that my measure of informal workers and the measure
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables in 2011
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
All firms Domestic firms FDI firms
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Informality share 31316 0.502 26373 0.562 4943 0.185
(0.399) (0.395) (0.238)
Log employment 52113 2.893 47023 2.693 5090 4.733
(1.518) (1.364) (1.632)
Log wage rate 51292 2.473 46222 2.412 5070 3.025
(0.781) (0.77) (0.658)
Log firm TFP 28855 1.687 25116 1.616 3739 2.162
(0.883) (0.84) (1.011)
Log revenue 51044 7.196 45995 6.912 5049 9.780
(2.45) (2.316) (2.102)
Export status 52184 0.140 47023 0.082 5161 0.672
(0.347) (0.274) (0.469)
Panel B: Correlations
Informal employment Informality share
Unskilled employment 0.1437
Share of unskilled workers -0.01
Notes:The standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Unskilled employment is measured as the
number of workers who are not trained for the profession.
of unskilled workers in previous studies may overlap.11 To address this issue, I exploit the
2011 survey that reports the number of workers by qualification training. Thus, unskilled
workers are measured as those who are not trained for the profession. Panel B of Table
2.2 shows the correlations between informal employment and unskilled employment and
between informality share and the share of unskilled workers. There is no evidence that
these measures are correlated in the data.12
11A number of empirical papers investigate the effect of FDI on the relative demand for skilled workers
(see Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Peluffo (2015), Souare and Zhou (2016), Blonigen and Slaughter (2001),
and Bandick and Hansson (2009)).




To investigate the relationship between a firm’s labor outcomes and ownership, I adopt
an approach that is widely used in the earlier literature.13 Several variations of the following
linear equation are estimated
Yijst = σ + δXijst + βownershipijst + λj + γs + θt + εijst, (2.1)
where Yijst is the outcome of interest for firm i of industry j in province s in year t (share of
informal workers in the firm, log of average wages, log of employment) ; Xijst is a vector of
time-varying firm characteristics (i.e. firm productivity measured by TFP, export status, firm
size, and an indicator for whether the firm is located in an economic zone) used to isolate the
FDI effect.14 Ownership is not the only factor that affects firms’ hiring of informal workers.
Firm heterogeneity and export activity are relevant factors in determining the demand for
informal workers. Cao (2018) finds evidence that firm productivity and export activity are
key determinants of informal employment. The economic-zone dummy sweeps out potential
differences across firms that are located inside and outside of economic zones that could
influence the outcomes. Oxfam (2015) reports that FDI firms and firms that trade are
encouraged to establish a physical presence in the economic zones in return for more favored
tax policy, better labor conditions, and ground infrastructure. The industrial zone indicator
could be correlated with all other independent variables. Hence, the exclusion of it biases
the estimated coefficient on ownership upward, increasing the likelihood of finding significant
relationship.15
13The estimation strategy is close to what has been used in the literature on FDI, wages, and employemtn
(see Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004b), Chen et al. (2011), and Karlsson et al. (2009)). For the literature on FDI
and productivity, see Aitken and Harrison (1999).
14When the dependent variable in Equation 2.1 is average wages, I control for differences across firms in
informality share and female share.
15From the policy point of view, it is interesting to know whether economic zones help the local government
lower the level of informality.
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The main independent variable, Ownershipijst, is a dummy variable indicating 1 if the
firm is 100% owned by foreign investors or a joint venture with foreign firms, and 0 otherwise;
λj, γs and θt are industry, province, and year fixed effects, respectively; and εijst is the error
term. Industry and province fixed effects absorb all time-invariant characteristics affecting
labor market conditions in an industry and a province, while year fixed effects capture
economy-wide institutional changes over time. I address the potential serial correlation
and heteroskedasticity issues by clustering the standard errors at the firm level. The
main parameter of interest is the coefficient on Ownershipijst. The coefficient β is the
average difference in informal share, wages, and employment level between multinationals
and domestic firms in the same industry, province, and year.
One potential issue with the identification of the FDI effect on the labor outcomes is
endogeneity bias in the cases where foreigners ”cherry pick” the best local firms through
M&A based on firm characteristics that are unobserved by econometricians.16 As a result,
the estimated cross-sectional effects of foreign ownership on the demand of informal labor are
biased. To address this endogeneity problem, I first claim that foreign M&A is not a common
practice in Vietnam during the period under analysis. FDI in Vietnam consists mostly of
”greenfield” investment as opposed to foreign M&A. Nevertheless, I econometrically mitigate
this problem by using a firm fixed effect model. Including firm fixed effects suggests that
the estimated parameter β is a measure of the change in the informality share of firms that
change their ownership. This specification focuses on M&A firms.
The above analysis focuses on comparing the informality share between domestic
and foreign firms. It has been suggested in the literature that there exist intra-industry
spillovers from FDI, implying that the entry of foreign firms has significant effects on a
number of outcome variables (e.g. productivity, employment, and wages) in domestic firms.
I examine informality spillovers in three different ways. First, to investigate the within-
industry spillover effects of foreign investment on informality share, I follow a benchmark
16The endogeneity problem is well reported in the literature. See Almeida (2007) for evidence.
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model used in the literature to investigate the spillovers of FDI (Aitken and Harrison, 1999)
by including the industry-level FDI intensity in Equation 2.1:
Yijst = σ + δXijst + βownershipijst + αFDI Sectorjt + ζFDI Provincest (2.2)
+λj + γs + θt + εijst,
where Yijst is the share of informal workers for firm i of industry j in province s in year t,
FDI Sectorjt represents within-industry FDI intensity (FDI presence in industry j at year
t), FDI Provincest represents within-province FDI intensity (FDI presence in province s at
year t), and all other notations are as in Equation 2.1.17 The coefficients of interest, α and ζ,
capture the spillover effects of foreign presence across industries and provinces, respectively.
To avoid confusion, I refer to a positive informality spillover as when α or ζ is positive and
vice versa. A positive spillover effect implies that the presence of FDI increases the relative
demand of informal labor, suggesting that the competition effects dominate the technology
spillovers. If the technology externalities are dominant, we will see a negative spillover.
One concern with these identifications of foreign spillovers is a potential endogeneity
bias. Firms’ demand for formal and informal workers could be a key determinant of FDI
inflows and outflows among industries and regions. For example, if foreign investment is
expected to flow into industries or provinces with the best infrastructure already in place and
where skilled labor is most likely to be available (i.e. industry/province with highly formal
intensity), then the negative effect of foreign informality spillovers will be overestimated. On
the other hand, if foreign multinationals are more eager to move into a low-cost and labor-
intensive industry/province (i.e. industry/province with highly informal intensity), then the
positive spillover effects are more likely to be overestimated.18 The inclusion of industry and
17I assume that foreign spillovers on informal employment operate in two different ways. First, FDI
participation impacts firms across regions but in the same industry. Second, foreign spillover effects operate
across industries but are restricted to the same region.
18According to the Foreign Investment Agency of the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam
government provides investment incentives for foreign investors. For instance, new projects in areas with
difficult socio-economic conditions are granted tax reductions and exemption on land rental.
42
province fixed effects serves to control for unobserved industry and province characteristics
that are correlated with foreign investors’ investment decision. I also experiment with a firm
fixed effect model to account for firm-level unobservables and the ”cherry picking” problem.
To investigate the spillover effects of FDI on domestic firms, I exclude all foreign firms from
my regression sample.
FDI Sectorjt is the regressor of interest, capturing the presence of FDI in industry j




i∈Ωjt FDI Firmijt ×Outputijt∑
i∈Ωjt Outputijt
,
where Outputijt measures the output of firm i of industry j in year t; FDI Firmijt measures
the foreign equity share of firm i in industry j in year t. Similarly, the within-province FDI
intensity is calculated as
FDI Provincest =
∑
i∈Ωst FDI Firmist ×Outputist∑
i∈Ωst Outputist
,
where Outputist measures the output of firm i of province s in year t; FDI Firmist measures
the foreign equity share of firm i in province s in year t.
2.5 Results
The results of estimating Equation 2.1 for several outcomes are presented in Table
2.3. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the regression of the share of informal
workers on ownership and firm characteristics. The coefficient on ownership is negative
and statistically significant, suggesting that foreign-owned firms hire informal workers at a
rate of 15.7 percentage points lower than domestic firms. More productive firms demand
19The measure is used by many papers such as Javorcik (2004) and Lu et al. (2017).
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Table 2.3 Differences between foreign-owned firms relatively to domestic firms
Informality share Employment Average wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI -0.157*** -0.069** 0.290*** 0.209*** 0.102*** -0.023
(0.005) (0.027) (0.016) (0.075) (0.007) (0.053)
TFP -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.126*** -0.089*** 0.334*** 0.315***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Export -0.088*** -0.019*** 0.716*** 0.088*** 0.021*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Size -0.033*** 0.001 0.430*** 0.191*** 0.001 -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Industrial Zone -0.097*** 0.177*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.006)
Informality Share -0.239*** -0.266***
(0.005) (0.008)
Female Share -0.209*** -0.065***
(0.010) (0.014)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 128406 128406 154125 154125 128215 128215
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
more formal employment. This effect holds for export activity since the share of informal
employment is 8.8 percentage points lower for firms that export. The results on productivity
and export status are consistent with Cao (2018)’s findings. Larger firms use a lower share
of informal workers. Firms located in industrial zones also have relatively low demand for
informal workers.20 The estimation results of the fixed effects model are reported in column
(2). The FDI coefficient is consistent with the OLS specification, is significant at the 5%
level, and indicates that, by focusing within variation, firms that change ownership from
domestic- to foreign-owned reduce their share of informal labor by 6.9 percentage points.
The reason for the smaller magnitude could be that the within-group variation is much less
20The industrial zone variable is excluded from firm fixed effect regression due to the fact that most firms
do not have location changed.
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than the between-group variation. The vast majority of FDIs in Vietnam are greenfield
investments, which means that foreign investors choose Vietnam to open their new plants or
factories. The magnitude of the impact of total factor productivity and exporting is smaller,
but the sign is still negative.
Columns (3) and (4) report results in which the outcome is total employment. The
coefficients on ownership are positive and significant, suggesting that FDI firms are larger
than domestic firms. The results of estimating Equation 2.1 for average wage are reported
in columns (5) and (6). Controlling for the differences in informality and gender share, I find
evidence that foreign-owned firms pay higher average wages. FDI firms pay approximately
10.2% higher average wages than domestic firms. The negative and significant coefficients
of informality share confirm that formal workers earn higher average wages than informal
workers.21
In sum, my findings show that foreign firms are different from domestic ones in terms of
the share of informal workers, size, and average wages. Multinationals are not only larger, but
also they use relatively more formal workers. Combined, this implies that FDI firms not only
contribute to the creation of jobs but also improve social development by creating relatively
more formal (better) jobs. Moreover, after controlling for the differences in informality share,
the average wages are higher in FDI firms. This is in line with the finding of previous studies
on foreign wage premium. In addition, there is evidence of wage premium for formal workers,
suggesting that, on average, informal workers are paid less in terms of wages and benefits.
Also, it is worthwhile to mention that firms in economic zone perform better in terms of
size, wages, and informality share. The findings shed some light on government policies that
try to eliminate informality and to increase wages. Further investigations will be needed to
completely explain the underlying channels.
21Cao (2018) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) theorize that formal wages are higher than informal wages.
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Table 2.4 Differences between origins of FDI firm relatively to domestic firms
Informality share Employment Average wage
(1) (2) (3)
Korea -0.172*** 0.393*** 0.128***
(0.007) (0.028) (0.010)
Japan -0.172*** 0.310*** 0.118***
(0.007) (0.036) (0.014)
Singapore -0.143*** 0.164*** 0.209***
(0.012) (0.056) (0.028)
Taiwan -0.162*** 0.278*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.025) (0.009)
Hongkong -0.187*** 0.665*** 0.087***
(0.015) (0.067) (0.026)
Malaysia -0.174*** 0.212*** 0.134***
(0.014) (0.069) (0.029)
U.S.A -0.143*** 0.171*** 0.166***
(0.017) (0.058) (0.034)
China -0.078*** 0.245*** 0.080***
(0.011) (0.040) (0.017)
Thailand -0.158*** 0.070 0.079*
(0.015) (0.083) (0.047)
Other countries -0.144*** 0.198*** 0.141***
(0.007) (0.031) (0.014)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The
coefficients on firm characteristics are not reported. All columns include industry, province, and year fixed
effects.
I further examine the extent to which the FDI effect is heterogeneous among origins
of FDI.22. To investigate whether there exists some country-specific effects of FDI, I exploit
the data that report the origins of FDI. Specifically, I categorize foreign investment based on
the list of countries that invest the most in Vietnam. These variables enter into a regression.
The estimated results for several outcomes with OLS are presented in Table 2.4. Coefficients
are interpreted as the differences between foreign firms from a country relatively to domestic
firms. For instance, column (1) shows that Korean-owned firms hire informal workers at a
rate of 17.2 percentage points lower than domestic firms. Among foreign firms, I observe
22Empirical studies document significant differences in firm productivity among FDI firms depending on
the origin of the foreign investment (see Chen (2011) and Kamal (2015))
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a similar pattern of hiring informal workers between Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese, Hong
Kong, Thai, and Malaysian firms. This could be due to the fact that these nations are close
in proximity. Moreover, these firms are significantly different from Chinese firms. There is
only a 7.9 percentage points difference between Vietnamese domestic firms and firms that
receive Chinese investment. The reason could be that Vietnam and China are border-sharing
countries and have a lot of similarities in terms of labor composition, technology, and work
environment. Chinese firms know how to work with informal workers in Vietnam, resulting
in a lower monitoring cost on informal workers than that of firms from other countries.
Furthermore, there is also evidence of differences among the origins of FDI when it comes to
firm size and average wages. These findings suggest that FDI firms are subject to significant
differences in labor structure, internal wage policy, and technology, depending on the origin
of the parent firm.
The spillover estimation results for Equation 2.2 are reported in Table 2.5. Columns
(1)-(2) show estimates of the spillover effect in all firms.23 I find that the coefficients on
FDI Sectorjt are negative and statistically significant, implying a negative effect on firms’
share of informal employment. Specifically, firms in industries that have higher FDI intensity
tend to hire a lower share of informal workers. The coefficients on FDI Provincest are
positive and opposite to the effect of industry intensity, implying that an increase in the
presence of FDI significantly increases the relative demand for informal labor in the same
province. The fixed effect specification is reported in column (2), suggesting that a 10
percentage point increase in the industry-level share of FDI lowers the informality share
by about 0.5 percentage points, and that a 10 percentage point increase in the FDI share
in the same province raises the informality share in all firms by 1.4 percentage points. In
this analysis, the spillover effect is the net effect of technology externalities and competition
channels. A negative spillover suggests that the effect through externalities may offset the
23It is worth mentioning that adding regressors FDI Sectorjt and FDI Provincest only makes a small
changes to other coefficients. These estimates look identical to the ones in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3
because of rounding.
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Table 2.5 Spillover effects of FDI on informal employment
All firms Domestic firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI -0.157*** -0.068**
(0.005) (0.027)
TFP -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.043*** -0.035***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Export -0.088*** -0.019*** -0.100*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Size -0.033*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industrial zone -0.097*** -0.123***
(0.004) (0.005)
FDI Sector -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.071*** -0.052***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011)
FDI Province 0.166*** 0.138*** 0.208*** 0.201***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
N 128406 128406 113178 113178
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
effect through competition channels. Focusing on the within-region spillovers, I can conclude
that the technology externalities are dominated by the competition effect. I interpret these
findings as suggestive that domestic firms are forced to use more informal workers due to the
intense competition from FDI firms in regional labor markets. Columns (3)-(4) report the
results of estimating Equation 2.2 only for domestic firms. The results are significant and
consistent with those for all firms.
In summary, my study suggests that foreign firms not only hire a lower share of
informal workers, but also that their within-industry presence reduces the share of informal
employment in domestic firms. Focusing on the within-region variation, FDI presence
increases the share of informal employment in domestic firms.
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2.6 Robustness Checks
This section analyzes three additional robustness checks. First, foreign spillovers may
be restricted to a larger-digit industry level. To test this, I use an alternative measure of FDI
presence. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.6 report the results when I use the FDI intensity
at the five-digit industry level. The results show that spillover effects are significant and
consistent and support the finding that technology spillovers outweigh competition effects
at the industry level.
Table 2.6 Robustness checks
Within five-digit
industry
Firms with more than
10 workers
Klein and Vella
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FDI -0.156*** -0.065** -0.143*** -0.061** -0.238***
(0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.027) (0.013)
TFP -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.033***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Export -0.089*** -0.018*** -0.058*** -0.016*** -0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Size -0.033*** 0.001 -0.045*** -0.005** -0.032***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Industrial zone -0.096*** -0.019*** -0.072*** -0.016*** -0.072***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
FDI Sector -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.002 -0.029**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.023) (0.012)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No
N 128406 128406 78094 78094 128406
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at firm level p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Column (5) reports the results using the estimator proposed by Klein and Vella (2009).
Second, a concern is that foreign spillover effects may be driven by small firms
because such firms with fewer than 10 workers enjoy a different labor law on social security
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contribution. I exclude from the sample all firms with fewer than 10 employees to examine
foreign informality spillovers to domestic firms. The results are presented in columns
(3) and (4). The magnitude of the coefficients on FDI are smaller but still significant,
providing consistent results with those reported in columns (1) and (2). The within-industry
foreign spillovers are insignificant in the OLS estimation but significant in the fixed effect
specification. Thus, the technology spillovers offset the competition effects.
Finally, the best way to address the endogeneity issue of the FDI variables in Equation
2.1 is to construct appropriate firm-level instruments. Unfortunately, the data do not
allow for the construction of IV. Instead, I employ a semi-parametric strategy by Klein
and Vella (2009) that employs heteroscedasticity to construct instruments from the existing
data. This method is more suitable in cases where the endogenous variable is binary. The
idea behind this identification is that, when there is significant changes in variance, the
heteroscedasticity problem helps identify the causal relationship between the informality
share and the ownership. I implement the K-V estimator as follows. First, consider the
equations:
Yijst = σ + βownershipijst + δ
′
Zijst + εijst (2.3)
Ownershipijst = µ+ α
′
Zijst + uijst, (2.4)
where Yijst is the outcome of interest and ownershipijst is the FDI dummy variable.Zijst
includes the elements in vector Xijst and the fixed effects in equation 2.1. Equations
2.3 and 2.4 do not have the exclusion restriction. However, they show that β can be
consistently estimated if the residuals uijst are heteroscedastic. Hence, I estimate equation
2.4 by heteroscedastic probit regression to generate the predicted probability of foreign
ownership. In the second step, I use this predicted probability as an instrument for the
binary ownership to estimate the impact of being foreign owned on the hiring of informal
workers. Therefore, this endogeneity corrections follows three stages: (1) the zero stage
generates the instrumental variables, (2) & (3) the second and third stage then provide the
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estimates using the standard 2SLS method. Column (5) present the results. The effect of
FDI on the share of informal workers is significant and larger than those reported in the
OLS estimations.
2.7 Conclusion
Understanding the link between FDI and informality is important to developing
countries, as they have experienced a dramatic increase in FDI inflows. Using Vietnamese
firm-level data, I investigate informality differentials and foreign spillover effects to domestic
firms. My findings suggest that foreign multinationals differ from domestic firms in terms of
the share of informal workers, size, and average wages. FDI firms have a larger workforce,
create more jobs, hire relatively more formal workers, and pay higher average wages for
a given workforce composition. Moreover, these firms are subject to differences in labor
structure, internal wages policy, and technology, depending on the origin of the parent firm.
In the second part of the analysis, I examine the technology spillovers and competition
effects. From a theoretical point of view, the FDI spillover effect on informal employment
can be either negative or positive, depending on the strength of the technology externalities
and the competition effects. Interestingly, I find that the presence of foreign investment
has significant spillover effects on the demand for informal labor in domestic firms at the
industry and province levels. My findings suggest negative within-industry spillover effects,
implying that an increase in FDI intensity in the same industry reduces the share of informal
workers of firms in that industry. In contrast, the presence of FDI in the same province
increases the informality level in firms in that province. The reason is that, focusing on
within-province spillovers, the competition effects are sufficiently strong due to the intense
competition between foreign multinationals and domestic firms in the regional labor market.
I recognize that there are a number of limitations to my study. The lack of data
availability does not allow me to adopt the method of instrumental variables to address the
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”cherry picking” issue at the firm level and the endogeneity bias problem at the industry level.
I also find it is difficult to disentangle the technology spillovers and the competition effects
because such a specification would require more extensive data that are not yet available.




Effects of Trade and FDI on Informal
Economy
3.1 Introduction
The informal economy accounts for a large share of GDP and the workforce in most
developing countries.1 According to the World Bank, informality contributes 25% to 40% of
annual output and up to four-fifths of non-agricultural employment in developing countries in
Asia and Africa.2 Cling et al. (2011) report that Vietnam’s informal sector contributes 20%
of GDP and 82% of employment.3 The country has experienced drastic tariff reductions and
foreign investment policy liberalization. While trade liberalization is believed to contribute
to economic growth and higher productivity, many have expressed concerns that it may
lead distributional consequences between the informal sector and the formal sector in these
developing countries. Existing empirical literature yielded mixed evidence regarding the
1The term “informal sector” has been used in terms of the economic context to describe a sector
with different characteristics, such as a low-level organization, a small-scale household enterprise, lack of
compliance with taxation and regulation, and lack of protection or benefit for workers
2http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/topics/extsocialprotection/extlm/0.
3McCaig and Pavcnik (2018), based on the 2002 and 2004 Vietnamese household surveys, report that
83% of workers work in a household business.
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effects of import liberalization and export opportunities on informality level in the home
country.
This study is motivated by two empirical facts in Vietnam. First, McCaig and Pavcnik
(2018) point to the co-existence of formal firms and informal firms (household businesses),
including licensed and unlicensed household businesses. The reason for not obtaining a
business license is unclear.4 Therefore, my model focuses on household businesses with and
without a license, which are called informal firms. In this model, the informal firms only
hire informal workers. Second, Cao (2018) shows that formal firms hire both formal and
informal labor, suggesting the co-existence of both types of worker in the formal sector.
This is because hiring informal workers is legal in Vietnam. Therefore, my model allows
the employment of both formal and informal workers by formal firms. I incorporate these
empirical facts into a general equilibrium model to examine the aggregate outcomes.
The main contributions of this paper is the analysis of the impact of trade and foreign
direct investment on the informal economy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that includes monopolistic competition and differentiated labor services.
While most studies focus on one aspect of trade or foreign investment, this study has
three exogenous disturbances: import competition, export opportunities, and FDI presence.
Moreover, my model is different from those used in the trade literature, because it allows
me to analyze the general equilibrium and transition dynamics of trade and FDI policy
liberalization. I employ a numerical analysis for symmetric countries, with parameters
selected to reflect economic characteristics in Vietnam, to derive the primary results and
frame the welfare analysis.5
The first result is that increased import competition enlarges the informal economy.
My results in this study demonstrate that a 10 percentage point reduction in import tariffs
increases the size of the informal sector by 1.5%. This result is similar to the findings of
4World Bank (2010) reports that the great majority of households had no difficulty registering a household
business. Cling et al. (2012) find no evidence of avoiding taxes by remaining unlicensed.
5I do not attempt to calculate optimal tariff or FDI policy. I assume that trade liberalization and FDI
presence begin at factual rates.
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Paz (2014) for the 1989-2001 Brazilian trade liberalization. His estimates indicate that a 10
percentage point reduction in import tariffs raises the informality share by 1.29 percentage
points. Attanasio et al. (2004) suggest that a similar change in tariffs raises the probability of
having an informal job by 0.87 percentage points. Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014) identify
a positive relationship between trade openness and informality in industries that experienced
sudden foreign competition in Argentina. They obtain larger estimates, which implies that
a reduction in average tariffs of 10 percentage points produces an incremental increase in
informality rates of 5.5 percentage points. This is because their analysis captures the effects
of multilateral trade liberalization, while this study analyzes the impact of a bilateral trade
agreement.
The second result is that increased export opportunities are associated with a decrease
in the size of the informal economy. My results are consistent with the findings of McCaig and
Pavcnik (2018), who employ the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement. Their
findings suggest that expanded export opportunities reduce the size of the informal economy
in Vietnam, inducing a reallocation of workers away from informal household businesses.
More specifically, they find that a reduction in U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports of 10
percentage points is associated with a 1.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of
informal labor in manufacturing industries. Paz (2014) finds a similar change, with foreign
import tariffs decreasing the informality share by 1.5 percentage points. These results are
larger than the estimates produced by this study, which suggest that a 10 percentage point
reduction in tariffs decreases informal employment by 0.1%. One possible explanation for
the difference is that this study captures a symmetric model in which two countries have the
same size and characteristics, while in fact the U.S. economy is about 100 times larger than
its counterpart, Vietnam.
The third main result is that FDI policy liberalization reduces informal output, leading
to a reallocation of workers from informal firms to the formal sector. I find that a 10% increase
in FDI presence shrinks the informal economy by more than 2%. This is consistent with the
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work of Dougherty and Escobar (2013), who find that Mexican industries with a larger FDI
presence experience a lower share of informal employment. These main results provided by
this paper are considerably important, because they imply that new export opportunities
and increased FDI presence provide a powerful market-based solution for improving social
welfare in developing countries, including Vietnam.
This paper falls into the growing body of trade literature that examines the impact of
trade liberalization on labor informality. Most of the empirical quantitative studies on trade
and informality are focused on India or Latin America, including Brazil, Argentina, Mexico
and Columbia. This study adds conclusive results to the extant literature, which to date has
yielded mixed results. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) find no impact from trade liberalization
in Brazil and some weak evidence of minimal effects stemming from trade reform in Colombia.
Bosch et al. (2012), using data from the Brazilian metropolitan labor market, do not that
trade reform has a significant effect on the rise in informality. Fugazza and Fiess (2010),
using different data sets to assess the sign of the relationship, do not find any conclusive
association with trade liberalization. They find that aggregate data generates results which
support the view that trade liberalization will lead to a rise in informality, while micro-
founded data does not. Finally, Castilla (2006) finds that reductions in Mexican import
tariffs are associated with decreases in the likelihood of informality in the tradable sector.
Of those tradable industries, informality’s decrease is less significant in more import-oriented
industries, and is greater in more export-oriented industries.
My study is also related to the literature on FDI. Although little is known about the
causal relationship between FDI and informality, one strand of literature emphasizes the
implications for employment. Waldkirch et al. (2009), Karlsson et al. (2009), and Bandick
and Gorg (2010) find that FDI has a significantly positive impact on local employment. In
contrast, Jude and Silaghi (2016) provide evidence that FDI leads to negative short-term
effects on employment in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the long-term effects are
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positive. My paper complements this literature to the extent that FDI contributes to the
creation of new formal jobs and the destruction of informal jobs.
This study is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide the trade and FDI models,
respectively. Section 4 presents the parameterization of these models. Section 5 analyzes the
effects of trade liberalization and FDI. Section 6 analyzes the sensitivity of the main results
to changes in key parameters. Section 7 describes the welfare analysis. Section 8 concludes
this study.
3.2 Trade shocks in a two-country model
The model is structured to examine the effect of increased import competition and
export opportunities on the size of the informal economy. The world economy consists of two
countries: home country and foreign country. The domestic (foreign) country is populated




In the home country, households consume a bundle of final goods, Ct, which is a












where ζ is the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods, and γ represents
the share of formal goods in the consumption basket. Formal goods, Ym, is a composite of
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where θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and η denotes the
share of domestic goods in the consumption basket of formal goods. The CES specification
above ensures the existence of exports and imports. The general price index for consumption
is Pt, the price index for formal goods is Pm,t, the price index for informal goods is Pn,t, the
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Yn,t = (1− γ)(pn,t)−ζCt (3.2)
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where asterisks indicate variables of the foreign country.




where the nominal exchange rate et is the price of one unit of domestic currency in terms of
foreign currency, and P ∗t is the foreign general price index.
Intertemporal problem
The domestic economy consists of a continuum of households indexed by i on the unit
interval. Each of them provides a homogeneous labor service as an informal worker and a
differentiated labor service as a formal worker. There are two types of firms: informal firms
in the informal sector, and formal firms in the formal sector. Informal firms exclusively
use informal workers, while formal firms use both formal and informal workers as their
inputs. This modeling strategy has two implications. First, the model does not capture the
decision of firms to enter formal or informal sectors. Second, it does not model the decision
of formal firms to use formal and informal labor. Instead, this information is abstracted
from the determinants of the hiring decision.6 The CES production function guarantees the
co-existence of both informal and formal firms.
6This feature of the model is consistent with Vietnamese data. McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) show the
existence of both the informal (household business) and formal (non-household business) sectors. Cao (2018),
using firm-level data, shows that formal firms hire both informal and formal workers. This is also in line
with the theory and empirics of Ulyssea (2018), who uses Colombian data.
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where lt denotes hours worked as formal labor in the formal sector, ht denotes hours worked
as informal labor in the formal sector, and nt denotes hours worked in the informal sector.
For each hour of work, formal workers earn wl, while informal workers in the formal sector
and informal sector earn wh and wn respectively.
7 κ represents the elasticity of substitution
between three types of labor.











where µ represents the labor demand elasticity. The standard individual labor demand














Household i maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint:
Ct(i) = wl,t(i)lt(i) + wh,tht(i) + wn,tnt(i) + Γt(i),













7I could model same wages for informal workers in both sectors. However, it is not possible to test this








In the following analysis, I follow Mineyama (2018) to impose an assumption that “each
household has access to a complete insurance market for consumption.” Consumption is
therefore identical across households:
Ct(i) = Ct
In a symmetric equilibrium, households choose same wages, and supply the same amount of

















Equation 3.13 indicates that each household requires constant markup µ
µ−1 on formal labor
services.





















3.2.2 Firms producing domestic goods










where Yd,t(j) is an intermediate input produced by the intermediate firm j, whose price
is pd,t, and ε represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The
domestic goods are used domestically and internationally. The law of one price applies to





























There is a continuum of firms indexed by j, producing a differentiated domestic input







Firms operate in monopolistic competition, setting prices subject to the demand of the firm








)−ε − wl,tlt(j)− wh,tht(j) +mct(j)[lαt (j)hαt (j)− Yd,t(pd,t(j)pd,t )−ε
]
where mct(j) is the Lagrangian multiplier, which can be interpreted as the real marginal
cost of producing an additional unit of output. The first order conditions w.r.t. labor:
wl,tlt(j) = mct(j)αYd,t(j)
wh,tht(j) = mct(j)(1− α)Yd,t(j)










In a symmetric equilibrium, firms have the same marginal cost, choose the same price, hire
the same amount of labor, and produce the same amount of output. Three equations above





This pricing strategy suggests that the price has a constant markup ε
ε−1 over the marginal















Domestic profits can be expressed as:
Γd,t = pd,tYd,t − wl,tlt − wh,tht
Firms that produce foreign intermediate goods face similar conditions:

























f,t − w∗l,tl∗t − w∗h,th∗t
3.2.4 Informal sector
The representative informal firm produces a homogeneous informal good using the
following Cobb-Douglas function:
Yn,t = nt (3.25)
The firm operates in a perfect competition environment and takes the price pn,t as given.
The profit maximization problem provides that
wn,t = pn,t, (3.26)
and profits are zero in equilibrium. The foreign informal firm face similar conditions:








I assume that traded goods are subject to international iceberg trade costs, τt and τ
∗
t .














) + εt (3.30)
where ρ denotes the persistence of a trade shock and εt represents an unexpected change in
the tariff barriers. τ and τ ∗ denote the steady state value of τt and τ
∗
t , respectively. The
parameter εt serves to model tariff policy shifts. It is worth noting that the parameter ρ does
not appear in steady-state equilibrium conditions, but plays a role in equilibrium dynamics.


















suggesting that the relative price of domestic (foreign) goods to foreign (domestic) goods in
the home (foreign) countries are equal if τ = τ ∗. In other words, the home term of trade
(ToT) is the same as the foreign ToT.
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3.2.6 Market clearing
Households’ consolidated budget constraint can be expressed as










Market clearing conditions are given by
mYd,t = mCd,t + τ
∗
t (1−m)C∗d,t (3.34)
(1−m)Y ∗f,t = τtmCf,t + (1−m)C∗f,t (3.35)
The latter two equations imply that the domestic (foreign) country must export τ ∗ (τ) units
of the domestic (foreign) goods in order for 1 unit to arrive at the destination. According to
Walras’s Law, one equation is redundant.
3.2.7 The impact of trade liberalization
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state. Without loss of generality,
I set θ = 1, indicating the Cobb Douglas aggregator for domestic and imported goods.8 The










where the hat is used to denote the percentage deviation from the steady state of the
variables.9 The positive steady state prices, pm and pn, ensures that B = (1 − 1
γp1−ζm
) < 0,
suggesting that formal and informal prices move in the opposite direction.





9See the Appendix for all log-linearized equations.
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Households’ optimality and firms’ profit maximization conditions guarantee that output
and labor inputs grow at the same rate, implying ŷn,t = n̂t and ŷd,t = l̂t = ĥt. Hence,
the change in labor composition is expected to come from the between-sector movement,
meaning households reallocate working hours between the formal and informal sectors. To
theoretically analyze how trade shocks impact domestic labor composition, the system of




B(1− η)(ζ − 1)
(ζ + 1)(B − 1)(ζ − 2Bζ + 1)
[





(1− η)(ζ − 1)
(ζ + 1)(B − 1)(ζ − 2Bζ + 1)
[






B2η(1− η)(ζ − 1)2




Bη(1− η)(ζ − 1)2
(ζ + 1)(B − 1)(ζ − 2Bζ + 1)
It is worth noting that these equations illustrate the transition of one equilibrium to
another, showing the long-term consequences of a permanent shock. This is slightly different
from my calibration practice in which I conduct stochastic shocks. Nevertheless, the use of
deterministic shocks does not change the results of this study.
Proposition 3.1. (i) Export opportunities increase (diminish) the size of the formal
(informal) sector.(ii) If the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods,
ζ, is less than one (and greater than zero), then increased import competition results in a
larger informal output and a smaller formal sector. 11
10κ is set equal 1






< 0, . For ζ > 1, the inequality signs flip.
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Trade liberalization can only impact the formal and informal sectors in opposite





have opposite signs. This





. The analysis provides conclusive results regarding how
trade openness drives the two sectors: if trade liberalization hurt the informal sector, it will
benefit the formal sector. Moreover, the first part of this proposition suggests that the effects
of export opportunities are decisive, i.e.,
dŷd,t
dτ̂∗t
< 0 and dŷn,t
dτ̂∗t
> 0. That is, increased access to
foreign markets helps the home country to reduce labor informality.
The directions of the effects of import competition, however, depend on the value of the
elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods, ζ. For the parameterization
process, I treat the formal and informal sectors as tradable and non-tradable, respectively.
The empirical literature shows positive estimates for cross-sector substitutability.12 Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that 0 < ζ < 1 in this analysis. The second part of this
proposition suggests that increased import competition through a reduction in foreign trade
costs expands the size of the informal sector, resulting in larger labor informality.
3.3 FDI shocks in a small closed economy model
This small closed economy model examines the effect of increased FDI presence on the
size of the informal economy. To ensure the model remains tractable, I remove the trade
feature from the previous model. The economy includes two sectors: formal and informal.
Firms in the informal sector use informal labor to produce informal goods. Formal goods
production combines the production processes of domestic and foreign firms, respectively
denoted as Yd and Yf . Foreign and domestic goods themselves are not traded. Firms in the
formal sector use both formal and informal workers for production.




Formal firms operate in a monopolistic market. The symmetric equilibrium guarantees












where ld,t denotes hours worked as a formal worker in domestic firms, hd,t denotes hours
worked as an informal worker in domestic firms, lf,t denotes hours worked as a formal workers
in foreign firms, hf,t denotes hours worked as an informal worker in foreign firms. Wages
equal marginal products owing to perfect competition in the labor market.
It is worth noting that any profits earned by foreign-owned firms are sent back to the




indicates that a fraction, v = ε−1
ε
, of the foreign output is used in the next domestic
production process.
Informal firms are similar to the trade model. They operate in a perfect competition,
producing a homogeneous informal good.
3.3.2 Households
Intratemporal problem
Final good production combines the production processes of formal and informal goods,
respectively denoted as Ym and Yn. The aggregate production function for the final goods is
similar to the trade model.
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where ηt denotes the share of Yf in the basket of the formal good. I do not model the decision
of foreign firms to enter the domestic market, instead abstracting from the determinants of
FDI. The CES production functions guarantee the co-existence of both domestic and foreign-
owned firms. The aggregator of foreign and domestic production therefore allows me to
capture the effect of an increase in FDI (through an increase in ηt) on the composition of the
local labor market. In addition, this simple setup allows me to emulate different interactions
between domestic and foreign-owned firms, as supplements or substitutes, for example.
Intertemporal problem
The informal sector is similar to the trade model. However, the formal sector includes
two types of firms: domestic and foreign-owned firms. Formal firms’ production processes
require both formal and informal workers. Similar to the trade model, formal workers provide
a differentiated labor service, while informal workers provide a homogeneous service. A

























subject to the following budget constraint
Ct = pd,tYd,t +
ε− 1
ε
pf,tYf,t + pn,tYn,t (3.40)











) + ut (3.41)
where ϕ is the persistence of an FDI shock and the parameter ut serves to model FDI policy
shifts. The parameter ϕ only plays a role in the equilibrium dynamics of the model.
3.3.4 The impact of FDI policy liberalization
The log-linear version of Equation 3.38 can be written as









Optimality conditions ensure ŷn,t = n̂t, ŷd,t = l̂d,t = ĥd,t, and ŷf,t = l̂f,t = ĥf,t. To
examine the effect of FDI policy liberalization on the local economy, I derive comparative
statics related to a firm’s output with respect to η̂t. One would expect a clear-cut result in







> 0. In other words, increased FDI leads to an expansion of foreign firms and a
contraction of domestic firms in the formal sector. However, the impact is ambiguous for the






(θ − 1)(1−B)(ζ + 1)
(3.43)
The signs depend on the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods, ζ,
and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, θ.
14This equation analyze the consequences of a permanent shock, which is not implemented in my calibrating
analysis. Using a deterministic shock does not change the result of this paper
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Proposition 3.2. For cross-sector substitutability, ζ, that is between 0 and 1, (i) If the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, also called the Armington
elasticity, is less than 1, then a higher FDI presence results in a smaller informal sector, (ii)
If the Armington elasticity is greater than 1, then increased FDI presence increases the size
of the informal sector.15
ζ is set between 0 and 1 to be consistent with the trade model. This proposition suggests
that the effects of FDI presence on the size of the informal sector depend on the relationship
between domestic and foreign goods. The first case shows that a decrease in informal output
is associated with increased FDI presence if the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods is lower than 1, meaning the two goods are more complementary. In the
second case, the result is flipped. When domestic and foreign goods are more like substitutes
(elasticity is greater than 1), then a higher FDI presence leads to an expansion of the informal
sector.
3.4 Calibration
The parameterization of the two models, summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, is set to
match the features of Vietnam. I assume the time unit is one year. Thus, the discount factor
is set at 0.9. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is equal to 1, implying κ = 1 based on
Keane and Rogerson (2012). The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ε,
and labor demand elasticity, µ, is set to 6, which implies a 20% markup in the steady state.
The elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods, ζ, is important in
this model. My propositions show that the effects of policies depend on the value of ζ.
Therefore, the best approach is to estimate the parameter using Vietnamese data. Due to
the lack of consumption data on formal and informal goods, however, I rely on estimates of
the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods. My assumption is that
15Notational form: For 0 < ζ < 1: (i) If θ < 1, then
dŷn,t
dη̂t





Table 3.1 Parameterization of the trade model
Parameter Baseline value Description
β 0.9 Discount factor
κ 1 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
µ 6 Labor demand elasticity
ζ 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods
m 0.5 Relative size of the domestic economy
α 0.7 Share of formal workers in formal firms
γ 0.6 Share of formal goods in the consumption basket
η 0.25 Share of domestic goods in the consumption basket of formal goods
θ 1 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
ρ 0.9 Persistence of a trade cost shock
τ (τ∗) 1.2 Initial domestic (foreign) trade costs
ε (ε∗) -0.08 Size of a domestic (foreign) tariff shock
Table 3.2 Parameterization of the FDI model
Parameter Baseline value Description
β 0.9 Discount factor
κ 1 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
µ 6 Labor demand elasticity
ζ 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods
αd 0.7 Share of formal workers in formal domestic firms
αf 0.9 Share of formal workers in formal foreign firms
γ 0.55 Share of formal goods in the consumption basket
θ 0.8 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
η 0.25 Share of domestic goods in the consumption basket of formal goods
(η represents the level of FDI presence)
ϕ 0.9 Persistence of a FDI shock
u 0.1 Size of a FDI shock
the formal and informal sectors are considered to be tradable and nontradable, respectively.
My baseline choice for cross-sector substitutability is 0.5, which is in line with Mendoza
(1995) and Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017). I test the sensitivity of my main results as I
change the cross-sector substitutability from 0.2 to 1.5.
The parameter εt is set such that the reductions in the tariff rate are always 10
percentage points. In the baseline calibration (the tariff rate is 20%, i.e. τ = τ ∗ = 1.2),
this implies a reduction in τ and τ ∗ of 8%. I set m, the relative size of the home country,
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to 0.5. This simplifies the model by providing a symmetric equilibrium. Using firm-level
data from Vietnam, I obtain the average share of informal workers in the formal sector
of about 30%. Thus, I set α = 0.7. Based on the ILO’s report, the informal sector
is estimated to contribute 20% of the Vietnamese GDP. Thus, I impose the restriction
pnYn/(pnYn + pdYd) = 0.2. I also document that Vietnamese imports in the GDP are above
60%. Thus, I set pfCf/(pnYn + pdYd) = 0.6. These two restrictions imply the share of
formal goods in the consumption basket, γ, to be 0.6, and the share of domestic goods in
the consumption basket of formal goods, η, to be 0.25. Finally, I set θ = 1, implying a
Cobb Douglas production function for the aggregator of domestic and foreign goods. This
completes the calibration strategy of the trade model.
The FDI model removes the trade feature but adds FDI presence to the domestic
economy. The parameter ut, used to model shifts in the FDI presence, is set so that FDI
presence increases by 10%. Consistent with the calibration of the trade model, I assume
that the share of formal workers in formal domestic firms, αd, is 0.7. Using the same
data set, I calculate the share of informal workers in formal foreign firms of about 10%,
implying αf = 0.9. In line with the calibration of the trade model, I impose the restriction
pnYn/(pnYn + pdYd) = 0.2, which implies γ = 0.55. The elasticity of substitution between
home goods and foreign goods (θ) is set at 0.8. This is consistent with the estimates of
Heathcote and Perri (2002), Corsetti et al. (2008), and Blonigen and Wilson (1999). However,
I employ a sensitivity analysis to investigate how the main results change in response to
changes in this parameter.
The parameters (ρ and ϕ) governing the persistence of the changes in trade and FDI
policies are set to 0.9. This implies that the changes are very persistent.16 I conduct a
sensitivity analysis to assess how the equilibrium dynamics of this model change in response
to changes in this parameter.














































Figure 3.1: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
3.5 Results
In this section, I analyze the effects of trade and FDI policy liberalization. The
horizontal axes indicate time in all figures. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the effects of an
8% decrease in trade costs, which is equivalent to a drop of 10 percentage points.17 The
vertical axes indicate the percent deviation from the initial steady state. Figure 3.1(a) shows
that the domestic trade barrier is gradually reduced. Panel (b) illustrates that domestic
trade liberalization gradually increases informal output, suggesting an expansion of informal
employment. This is due to the decrease in trade costs, which exert an increase in import
17The initial trade barrier is 20%. After the shock, trade barrier drops to 10%.
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competition in the formal sector. One year after the shock, the informal sector grew by 1.5%.
This result is consistent with the existing empirical literature. Panel (d) shows that output
in the formal sector declined by about 0.4% in the first year. Panels (c) and (e) illustrate
that informal wages increase more than the formal wages. This explains the reallocation
of workers from the formal sector to the informal sector. The net effect on consumption is
presented in panel (f), showing that it increased by 5% in the short term. The increase in










































Figure 3.2: Dynamic effects of foreign trade liberalization
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
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Figure 3.2(a) shows the decrease in foreign trade barriers. Formal domestic firms
expand because of better export opportunities, which leads to the contraction of the informal
sector. Figures 3.2(b) and (d), therefore, show the formal sector expands by almost 0.03%,
while the size of the informal sector is reduced by 0.1%. The decrease in informal output
dominates the increase in formal output. Hence, panel (f) shows that consumption drops
by 0.3% in the short term. Panels (c) and (e) show that the decrease in the foreign trade
barrier lowers informal wages more than it does formal wages. This comparative advantage
in wages allows formal firms to hire more workers.
Figure 3.3 shows the effect of higher FDI presence. The vertical axes show the
percentage deviations. Figure 3.3(a) illustrates a 10% increase in η, which demonstrates
an increase in FDI. As a result, formal foreign firms expand, while domestic firms contract.
However, the total output of the formal sector is reduced due to greater competition from
FDI firms. Because the model is calibrated with formal and informal goods as complements,
decreased formal output leads to a decline in informal output. Panels (b), (d), and (f),
therefore show the dynamic effects on informal, domestic, and foreign firms, respectively.
Informal output and employment decline by slightly more than 2%. This is explained by
the wage responses in panels (c), (e), and (g). Specifically, informal wages decline by almost
10%, which is larger than the decline found in formal domestic and foreign firms. Panel (h)
illustrates that FDI policy liberalization hurts households, with consumption dropping by
7%.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I determine the dependence of the main results on key parameter values.
I first analyze the role of cross-sector substitutability in the trade model, and I then shed
light on the Armington elasticity in the FDI model. Table 3.3 demonstrates the dependence













































Figure 3.3: Dynamic effects of FDI policy liberalization
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
It reveals that elasticity plays an important role in determining not only the size but also
the direction of the effects of import competition. For ζ < 1, import competition increases
the size of the informal sector. If elasticity is at 1.5, an increase in import competition leads
to a reduction in the informal sector and an expansion of the formal sector.
Table 3.4 reveals that the higher the elasticity, the smaller the effects of export
opportunities on the output of both sectors. It also demonstrate that the signs of the effects
are not dependent on cross-sector substitutability. Table 3.5 illustrates how responsive the
main outcomes are to changes in the Armington elasticity. It shows that an increase in the
Armington elasticity implies larger effects of FDI on foreign firms’ output. This comes at
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a cost to formal domestic firms, i.e., their output is reduced. If the Armington elasticity is
at 1.5, the informal sector experiences the positive effect of increased FDI. The net effect,
however, is still in favor of the formal sector.
Table 3.3 The short-term effects of import competition: Different cross-sector
substitutabilities
ζ = 0.2 ζ = 0.5 (benchmark) ζ = 0.8 ζ = 1.5
Informal output 3.8% 1.7% 0.5% -0.5%
Informal wages 9.5% 6.7% 4.6% 2.1%
Formal Output -0.41% -0.45% -0.2% 0.6%
Formal wages 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 3.2%
Consumption 5.7% 5% 4.1% 2.6%
Table 3.4 The short-term effects of export opportunities: Different cross-sector
substitutabilities
ζ = 0.2 ζ = 0.5 (benchmark) ζ = 0.8 ζ = 1.5
Informal output -0.2% -0.09% -0.01% -0.04%
Informal wages -0.5% -0.37% -0.13% 0.15%
Formal output 0.021% 0.025% 0.006% 0.04%
Formal wages -0.3% -0.25% -0.1% 0.24%
Consumption -0.3% -0.28% -0.1% 0.2%
Table 3.5 The short-term effects of FDI: The role of different Armington elasticity
θ = 0.2 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.8 (benchmark) θ = 1.5
Informal output -0.21% -0.66% -2.3% 0.91%
Informal wages -0.8% -2.6% -9.5% 3.6 %
Formal domestic output -0.53% -0.66% -0.38% -1.7%
Formal domestic wages -1.2% -2.6% -7.5% 1.1%
Formal foreign output 1.1% 2.7% 4% 4.3%
Formal foreign wages 0.49% 0.68% -3% 7.1%
Consumption -0.65% -2% -7.1% 0.2%
Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 show the changes in equilibrium dynamics in















































Figure 3.4: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.5
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
3.7 Welfare analysis
In this section, I describe a welfare analysis of trade and FDI policy liberalization.


















or in recursive form:

























































Figure 3.5: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.99
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
The results are displayed in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. The vertical axes show percent deviations
from the steady state. Figure 3.10(a) shows that domestic trade liberalization leads to
a gain in welfare, which is primarily attributable to higher consumption. Specifically, a
10 percentage point decrease in domestic trade costs increases welfare by almost 3%. In
contrast, panel (b) indicates that a decrease in foreign trade barriers results in a welfare loss
for home households. The magnitude of the loss- only about 0.16%-is rather small.
In Figure 3.11, increased FDI presence decreases the home country’s welfare, suggesting











































Figure 3.6: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.5
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
contraction in formal and informal domestic firms. Households earn lower wages, a result
which in turn forces them to consume less.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the effects of trade and FDI liberalization in models that combine
Armington and monopolistic elements. I choose the parameters of the two models to reflect
existing tariff barriers and characteristics in Vietnam to derive the main results. My findings











































Figure 3.7: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.99
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
in import competition. Alternatively, new export opportunities and larger FDI presence
improve labor conditions by reducing the informality level.
I recognize there are a number of limitations of my models because they exclude several
channels through which trade and FDI liberalization may affect the informal economy. First,
my trade model is unable to capture the impact of trade on the hiring of informal labor within
the formal sector. In particular, exporting increases sales volatility (Nguyen and Schaur,
2010; Vannoorenberghe, 2012), which in turn raises demand for informal employment in













































Figure 3.8: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.5
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
Second, my FDI model is not able to address the reallocation of informal workers
within the formal sector in response to increased FDI presence. Cao (2019), using firm-
level Vietnamese data, examines the direct effects and the spillover effects of FDI on formal
firms’ hiring of informal workers. He finds that foreign-owned firms employ a lower share of
informal labor. He also points out that industries with a higher FDI presence experience a
decrease in demand for informal workers.
Third, I ignore one of the most important characteristics of FDI, which I am not able to
incorporate in my model: the attractiveness of Vietnam as an export platform. The United













































Figure 3.9: Dynamic effects of domestic trade liberalization: ϕ = 0.99
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
platform for the production of manufactured goods for the global economy,” which stands
in contrast to the market-seeking foreign investment employed in this study. To address this
topic, I either allow a trade feature in the FDI model or combine the trade and FDI models.
Therefore, further research is needed.
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Figure 3.10: Welfare effects of trade liberalization
Notes: All variables are expressed in percent deviations from steady state. Panel (a) represents a welfare
gain from domestic trade liberalization. Panel (b) shows a welfare loss in response to a decrease in foreign
trade barrier.
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Figure 3.11: Welfare effects of FDI policy liberalization
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Proof of Proposition 1
If firms do not hire informal workers then st+1 = 1. If firms hire informal workers than
the optimal number of workers is determined by (1.2) and lFt+1 = l̃. Rearranging the first






















(σ − 1)l̃ + Θσl̃(1− δG(αM) + δG(α)m)













































= 0. Also, ∂L
∂ϕ
decreases in Θ and ∂l̃
ϕ





at Θ = 0, it must be positive if Θ > 0, and, it must be negative if Θ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
With some minor additional notation Saint-Paul (1997) shows that lIt+1 > 0 ⇐⇒













(σ − 1)l̃ + Θσl̃(1− δG(αM) + δG(α)m)


















= 0. In other words, the
numerator and denominator do not change if ϕ changes. Therefore, as productivity changes
the probability of hiring informal workers remains the same.
Now consider ∂m
∂ϕ
= Θ > 0. Note that dl̃
dϕ
increases in Θ. Also note that the denominator
in α decreases in l̃. Then, because the denominator does not change in productivity when
Θ = 0, it must be the case that the denominator decreases when Θ > 0. In addition, if
Θ > 0, then the numerator increases if productivity increases. Therefore, as productivity
increases, the probability of hiring an informal worker decreases in this case. By the same
argument, the probability decreases if ∂m
∂ϕ
= Θ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
l̃ is implicitly determined by the equation


















change in the distribution lowers the right hand side of this equation.























































< 0 imply that
the third term is positive.



























Because y decreases as l̃ increases, this implies that as l̃ increases, the right hand side of
equilibrium condition (47) decreases.
If the distribution changes such that G∗(α) > G(α), then the integral in the equilibrium
condition for given bounds increases. This implies that the right hand side of the equilibrium
condition will decrease. To offset this, l̃ must decrease.
A.2 Data appendix
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Pre BTA (2002) Post BTA (2003-2005) 2010-2013
Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N
Total employment 187.37 569.03 9628 187.27 688.45 40096 156.21 780.44 121588
Number of informal workers 20.20 122.36 8623 19.37 121.41 36716 35.69 131.06 93849
Share of informal workers 0.14 0.26 8596 0.13 0.26 36662 0.42 0.34 93849
Probability of informal employment 0.49 0.50 8596 0.42 0.49 36662 0.85 0.36 93849
Notes: For pre-BTA and post-BTA the statistics are calculated using data at the beginning of the year; the year-end data is
used for the 2010-2013 period. The number of observations varies due to missing variables.
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B Chapter 3
B.1 The trade model
It can be easily proved that ŷn,t = n̂t and ŷd,t = l̂t = ĥt. The hat is used to denote the
percentage deviation from the steady state of the variables. The log-linearized conditions of
the model around the steady state are the following. Home18:
ĉt = ŷm,t + ζp̂m,t (2.1L)
ĉt = ŷn,t + ζp̂n,t (2.2L)
p̂m,t = Bp̂n,t (2.3L)
ŷm,t + p̂m,t = ĉd,t + p̂d,t (2.4L)
ŷm,t + p̂m,t = ĉf,t + p̂f,t (2.5L)
ŵl,t = p̂d,t (2.20L)
ŵh,t = p̂d,t (2.21L)
ŵn,t = p̂n,t (2.26L)
κŷd,t = p̂d,t − ĉt (2.7L)
κŷn,t = p̂n,t − ĉt (2.13L)




f,t , and the budget constraint
Equation 3.32 to show that Cd,t = ηYd,t. The log-linearzed equations are as following:
ŷm,t = ηĉd,t + (1− η)ĉf,t
18The equation number represents the corresponding number of the non-linearized version. For example,
Equation 2.1L is the log-linear version of Equation 3.1
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ĉd,t = ŷd,t
ĉ∗d,t = ŷd,t − τ̂ ∗t (2.34L)


















































τ̂ ∗t = ρτ̂
∗
t−1 + εt
The law of one price:
p̂d,t − p̂f,t = p̂∗d,t − p̂∗f,t − τ̂t − τ̂ ∗t (2.31L)
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B.2 The FDI model
Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition of the model are the following:
Ym,t = γ(pm,t)
−ζCt (49)
Yn,t = (1− γ)(pn,t)−ζCt (50)
1 =
[




























































































) + ut (68)
Log-linearization
It is true that ŷn,t = n̂t, ŷd,t = l̂d,t = ĥd,t, and ŷf,t = l̂f,t = ĥf,t. The log-linear versions
of the model are the following.
ĉt = ŷm,t + ζp̂m,t (8.1L)
ĉt = ŷn,t + ζp̂n,t (8.2L)
p̂m,t = Bp̂n,t (8.3L)
ŷm,t = ŷd,t + θp̂d,t − θp̂m,t (8.4L)
ŷm,t = ŷf,t + θp̂f,t − θp̂m,t − θη̂t (8.5L)




ŵld,t = p̂d,t (8.10L)
ŵhd,t = p̂d,t (8.11L)
ŵlf,t = p̂f,t (8.12L)
ŵhf,t = p̂f,t (8.13L)
ŵn,t = p̂n,t (8.14L)
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κŷd,t = p̂d,t − ĉt (8.15L)
κŷf,t = p̂f,t − ĉt (8.16L)
κŷn,t = p̂n,t − ĉt (8.19L)
η̂t = ϕη̂t−1 + ut (8.20L)
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